

JPRS-WER-87-032

15 APRIL 1987

West Europe Report



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

15 APRIL 1987

WEST EUROPE REPORT

CONTENTS

POLITICAL

DENMARK

Schluter Discusses Likely Campaign Issues, Sees Fall Election (BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 22 Feb, 1 Mar 87; AKTUELST, 11 Mar 87)	1
Coalition Internal Strife 'Annoying', Poul Schluter Interview	1
Expects 'Late Fall' Election, by Ole Lorenzen	8
Poll Indicates Conservatives Gaining, by Thorkild Dahl	9
Paper Advises Election Delay, Editorial	11

FINLAND

Book Examines History of SDP Security Policy (Jukka-Pekka Pietiainen; HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 26 Feb 87)	13
--	----

ECONOMIC

FINLAND

Sorsa Urges 'Controlled' Internationalization of Economy (UUSI SUOMI, 9 Feb 87; HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 27 Feb 87)	16
Problems in World Trend	16
Rejects EC Full Membership	17
Country's Firms Urged To Study USSR Joint Venture Potential (Kustaa Hulkko; HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 3 Mar 87)	19

FRANCE

Paper Analyzes Labor Situation (LIBERATION, 26 Feb 87; L'USINE NOUVELLE, 8 Jan 87)	24
Unemployment Estimates, by Martine Gilson	24
Strike Limitations Imposed, by Sylvie Bommel	25

NETHERLANDS

Lubbers on Unemployment, Wages, Economizing, Labor Party (Lubbers Interview; DE VOLKSKRANT, 21 Feb 87)	27
---	----

MILITARY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Sweden Becoming Important Supplier for Norwegian Forces (Nils Petter Tanderø; ARBEIDERBLADET, 21 Jan 87)	35
---	----

DENMARK

Jorgensen, Engell Debate Ways To Get Security Plan Consensus (AKTUELT, 17, 26 Feb 87; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 16 Mar 87)	36
Jorgensen Cites 'Norwegian Model', by Anker Jorgensen	36
Engell Denies 'Rationalization' Effective, by Hans Engell	39
Harmful As Campaign Issue	42

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Vulnerability of Strategic Baltic Approaches Reviewed (Franz Wauschkuhn; RHEINISCHER MERKUR/CHRIST UND WELT, 9 Jan 87)	46
Chief Medical Officer Sees Gains in Staffing, Structure (Claus Voss; BUNDESWEHR AKTUELL, 18 Feb 87)	51
Border, Land Police Forces Said Inadequate for Defense Needs (Hans-Juergen Schmidt; ZIVILVERTEIDIGUNG, No 4, 1986) ...	53
Civil-Military Coordination for 'Total Defense' Seen Lacking (Helge Schulenberg; ZIVILVERTEIDIGUNG, No 4, 1986)	62

NORWAY

Admiral Asserts NATO Dissatisfied With Norwegian Fleet (Liv Hegna; AFTENPOSTEN, 6 Feb 87)	71
--	----

NATO's Northern Europe Commander: Forces Obsolete (Liv Hegna; AFTENPOSTEN, 3 Feb 87)	72
General Supports Aircraft Carriers in Norwegian Sea (Liv Hegna; AFTENPOSTEN, 31 Jan 87)	74
Economic Benefit Seen in Joint Submarine Building Pact (ARBEIDERBLADET, 1 Feb 87)	76

SWITZERLAND

Fortress System Adapted to New Combat Conditions, Weapons (Rolf Siegenthaler; SCHWEIZER SOLDAT + MFD, Feb 87)	77
--	----

/9986

SCHLUTER DISCUSSES LIKELY CAMPAIGN ISSUES, SEES FALL ELECTION

Coalition Internal Strife 'Annoying'

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 22 Feb 87 p 6

[Interview with Prime Minister Poul Schluter by John Wagner; date and place not given; first 11 paragraphs are BERLINGSKE TIDENDE introduction]

[Excerpt] "A gamble involving government influence." That is how Prime Minister Poul Schluter described the disagreement between the Liberals and the Christian People's Party over the government's proposed plan of action to deal with ocean pollution. In this interview with the Sunday edition of BERLINGSKE TIDENDE the prime minister made the following points clear:

The environmental dispute is the most annoying thing that has happened in his 4 1/2 years as prime minister.

The internal strife has weakened the government on the environmental issue and it is generally a "gamble" when some parties "act irresponsibly" and "overemphasize a standpoint."

It would probably have been possible to restore calm and unanimity somewhat more quickly if he and the foreign minister had not both been out of the country at the time.

The government will have to accept it as a reality if a Folketing majority again backs the Radical Liberal demand for a tax on artificial fertilizer.

It would be a shame to hold an election based on the environmental issue.

He still intends to remain in office for the entire election period or at least for most of it.

The four coalition parties should work out a plan for government activity in the next election period in advance.

He is concerned about the effects of the contract renewals, which could be a problem for the government, and said they will implement a new "Easter package" or "fall corrective" if it becomes necessary.

We cannot afford tax relief before the end of the next election period.

And finally he does not regret his remark about the so-called fool.

[Question] Do you now regret that you went to Lanzarote on vacation instead of staying home and keeping the government quiet?

[Answer] When I took off on Sunday morning, 1 February, we had reached an agreement on Saturday afternoon concerning the plan of action for dealing with ocean pollution--we were in complete agreement and we still are. I felt then that I had a right to take a week off after a long and demanding winter season. And that particular week when Folketing was also having a winter recess seemed an appropriate time for me to take a little vacation myself.

There is no denying that a fracas ensued and I wish I could have avoided that. It has been going on for several weeks now...but we have never really made any secret of the fact that when it comes to the pollution of ocean waters around Denmark there are differences between the position of the Environmental Ministry, which must combat the pollution effectively, and the Agricultural Ministry, which must work just as hard to provide the best possible production conditions for Danish farmers. Therefore it is also natural that the two ministers have different starting points. The trick is to unite the two viewpoints and the plan of action succeeded in doing so.

What happened after that was that a report of little interest in itself was leaked to the press. That created some surprise among government politicians in the Folketing group and led to some hasty and not particularly productive comments being made--some of them by ministers.

The fracas was the fault of the government--or the government parties in particular. But there is also another side to the matter, namely the need of the opposition parties to make a tactical point and to drive a wedge between the government parties and the Radical Liberals. It often happens in the days leading up to an interpellation debate that the Social Democrats deliberately map out a strategy and tactics that cause the factual substance of the issue to be lost. And the whole thing becomes a matter of outcompeting and outbidding each other, which results in parliamentary turmoil.

Many believe that all this turmoil means a great deal. I should be the one who is allowed to decide that. People should not put too much emphasis on this strife. And I took the same approach myself recently with regard to the Radical resolution on the environment. I would have preferred being able to reach an agreement with the Radicals on a resolution, but it was not possible. Not at this time. But that does not worry me much because now we are starting the real political work in the Folketing Environmental Committee...and we will reach the finish line by 1 May.

Agreement by 1 May

[Question] What will be the final result?

[Answer] I expect we will reach a fairly broad agreement on most of the things in the plan of action by 1 May.

[Question] In other words, the government will swallow the Radical demand for a tax on artificial fertilizer?

[Answer] The government did not want a tax and we have felt all along that it is wrong to commit ourselves at this time to a specific tax of so many kroner per kilogram in 1990. There are many good reasons for this.

But I consider it likely that the Radical demand for a tax will win the support of a majority once again. If that happens I assume that all the government parties will agree that this must be accepted as a reality. Then we will have to see if consumption does not decline so drastically by 1990 that the need for the tax will be eliminated.

[Question] Are you worried that some of the government parties will not agree with you?

[Answer] No.

Internal Strife

[Question] Are you a disappointed prime minister today--disappointed because the Christian People's Party and the Liberals are criticizing each other in public and because the Radical Liberals have once again formed a "green majority" with the Social Democrats and the Socialist People's Party [SF]?

[Answer] I see the fact that the Radicals were tempted to sharpen their resolution to ensure Social Democratic support as having some connection with the fact that the government weakened its position on this issue as a result of its internal strife. So we will not keep it up. This should be a lesson to us.

[Question] Are you conceding voluntarily that the internal dispute between the Christian People's Party and the Liberals has weakened the government's influence?

[Answer] Yes, at least on this issue. It is a fact that if one over-emphasizes a standpoint and carries it to extremes so that one loses contact with other parties whose help is needed to create final results, it is a gamble that can definitely lead to loss of influence.

[Question] Should that also be regarded as a general warning to the government parties about the cost of disagreement in terms of lost influence?

[Answer] Yes, something can be learned from this. But I would also like to add: How often did we see how hard it was for Anker Jorgensen to achieve agreement between the different factions in the Social Democratic Party? On the other hand, as the leader of a government consisting of four parties I have managed for 4 1/2 years to maintain good cooperation with hardly any episodes and as a rule I have also succeeded in maintaining good contacts with the Radical Liberals. After all there are four--or five--different parties involved and once in a while it has to become obvious--even in public--that these are independent parties with their own individual profiles.

Avoiding episodes is not the important thing. The important thing is that they remain episodes--and that we quickly return to the straight and narrow path and demonstrate to ourselves and the public that this was just an episode without much effect on a cooperative effort that is otherwise excellent.

I hope and believe that all of us, the government parties as well as those who vote for them, have learned something from the latest episode about how important it is to foster cooperation. A four-leaf clover is a somewhat unusual plant, not a common one. It needs to be given a great deal of care.

Annoying Issue

[Question] Has the environmental conflict been your most difficult issue as prime minister?

[Answer] It has been the most annoying issue, but definitely not the most difficult one. We have had harder and more complex issues to deal with. But it has been an annoying affair, extremely annoying.

[Question] We understand that at last Tuesday's cabinet meeting you had to pound on the table to halt a continuation of the discussion between Christian Christensen and Britta Schall Holberg. And according to unconfirmed reports of a Conservative group meeting, you said you are "tired of being stabbed in the back by the Liberals" and that "a Conservative minority government is a temptation."

[Answer] I did not pound on the table, but I can confirm that we made some minor corrections in the environmental minister's speech in the course of the meeting. We always do that when ministers submit the draft of a speech. My opening speech to Folketing probably gets the most corrections.

With regard to the other rumors I would like to say this: I certainly do not feel that anyone has stabbed me in the back. I would not criticize the behavior of any of the government parties toward me.

[Question] But some parties have been disloyal to the government cooperation, haven't they?

[Answer] They have behaved irresponsibly when it comes to the four-party government's reputation for internal loyalty. I will admit that.

[Question] Are you thinking of the Liberal Party?

[Answer] I am not thinking of a single party.

[Question] Are you thinking of two parties--the Liberals and the Christian People's Party?

[Answer] I will not mention any names.

[Question] There are government politicians who maintain that many of the internal disagreements could be avoided if Uffe Ellemann-Jensen was not foreign minister and thus away on trips so much of the time.

[Answer] I agree with the view that if the foreign minister and I had not been away at the same time--if only everyone else had taken a vacation too!--it would probably have been possible to restore peace and unanimity somewhat sooner.

But what happened is over and done with. And it may have been quite educational. Perhaps we have become wiser as a result of the debate over the environment. That is my hope and my belief.

[Question] Do you also believe you can avoid more self-centered attempts to profile parties in the period leading up to the next election?

[Answer] Of course the small government parties have a greater need than the big ones to outline their own special characteristics. The Conservative Party is the biggest government party and that clearly obligates us to be the most understanding party and to make the biggest effort to maintain peace in the ranks.

[Question] What about medium-sized parties like the Liberal Party?

[Answer] I think it is true for all four parties that loyalty to the four-party coalition is fundamental to the outcome on Election Day.

[Question] What do you have to say about the prospect that the environmental issue will be a major theme in Danish politics for many years--and that it could also be the main theme in the next election?

[Answer] That it would be a shame to base an election on environmental issues. That would lead to a distortion and vulgarization of the debate. Certain political forces would engage in a contest to outbid each other without showing any restraint or self-criticism at all. I would rather have the environmental questions resolved before the election is held.

[Question] Does that mean that approval of the plan of action at the end of April will automatically trigger an immediate election?

[Answer] No, let's get started on implementing the plan right away.

Fall Election

[Question] There have been election rumors going around ever since the contract renewals. When will the election be held?

[Answer] I expect the election to be held toward the end of Folketing's 4-year election period. It would be valuable in itself if we do our best to live up to the constitutional precept of a 4-year election period. So it is still our goal to utilize the period entirely or almost entirely.

[Question] What would you prefer to see as the main theme of the election?

[Answer] Naturally the decisive question will be who the voters want to lead the country. The Social Democrats, who gave up in September 1982, or the four-party coalition.

But the political content will also be interesting. In my opinion the four government parties should stress in the campaign debate the visions and goals we all have for Denmark's development up to the year 2000.

[Question] What do you say to a suggestion that the four government parties should use the summer recess to work out a joint plan for government activity in the next election period?

[Answer] That is an excellent idea. We should outline the goals we have for Denmark's development, for example the role of the public sector.

Today we have a public sector that is too large and an overall public spending level that is too high unless we can stimulate more growth and vitality in the private sector in the coming years.

Wage Concerns

[Question] Do you admit that the contract renewals will not contribute to this growth in the private sector because they will not lead to the necessary improvement in our competitiveness on foreign markets?

[Answer] I am concerned about the effect of the contract renewals myself. Everyone, including the Federation of Trade Unions [LO] and the Danish Employers' Federation, knows that wage hikes are detrimental to competitiveness.

This time the government did not set the rate for wage increases. That was done by the private business sector with the agreement that was

reached in the iron branch and we had to follow that level in the contract renewals in the public sector.

[Question] Is that level too high?

[Answer] It is a level that will certainly give us problems unless we can bring about the productivity increase in the next few years that all of us feel we should have seen already.

[Question] Various chief economists agree that the government will be forced to carry out a new "Easter package" or "fall corrective."

[Answer] If it becomes necessary we will do it. We have not lacked the courage to do so in the past. But it is still the opinion of the government that there is no need for another intervention. Don't forget that last year we implemented what National Bank director Erik Hoffmeyer called the biggest austerity process in Danish history. The Christmas and Easter packages plus the fall corrective.

I still believe that when most Danes notice the effects of the fall corrective in the next few months in combination with the tax benefits provided by the tax reform, they will curtail their consumption and indebtedness.

[Question] How can the government convince the voters that there will not be another intervention immediately following the next election?

[Answer] We must now wait several months to determine the effects of the fall intervention and the significance of the contracts. If we have an election in the late fall, as I expect, then...then I would like to say this: If at that time it appears that there will be a need after the election for even more austerity measures, I will certainly tell the voters about it before the election. We have never been afraid to tell the truth.

[Question] It sounds as if you are no longer much of an optimist.

[Answer] Of course I am still an optimist, why wouldn't I be?

We have achieved good results in our first 4-5 years: We have received a gold medal from OECD for creating 200,000 new jobs, enormous investment increases, a strong increase in production and balancing the state budget. We have also received a silver medal for an increase of 41 percent in exports since 1982. Only the Japanese have done better.

But we have also had a few record lows. I will admit that. One is the balance of payments deficit which is still much too high and another is the tax burden which is also much too high.

Now it is a question of maintaining the good results and solving the last two problems in the next election period. We should probably realize that it will take another 4 years.

[Question] The government never hides the fact that the so-called spending pressure has been reduced. Isn't it time the taxpayers are allowed to feel that in the form of some tax relief?

[Answer] We will undoubtedly have a lower tax burden eventually, but not before the balance of payments deficit has been reduced substantially.

[Question] When will that be?

[Answer] I hesitate to make any promises. I also hope that few voters believe extravagant chrome-plated election promises concerning things like tax relief. But I will venture to say that the goal should be a reduction of the tax burden within the next election period. I cannot say whether it will come in the third or fourth year of the election period. That would be pure guesswork.

Expects 'Late Fall' Election

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 11 Mar 87 p 14

[Article by Ole Lorenzen]

[Text] Prime Minister Poul Schluter (Conservative) expects to hold the election in the late fall--which means late October or early November.

Radical Liberal leader Niels Helveg Petersen told AKTUELT that it seems sensible to have an election at that time.

The government and the Radical Liberals would then avoid a serious and decisive battle over the budget before the election. The budget is scheduled for a vote on 18 December. In Poul Schluter's words that will be after the election.

"It would be inconsiderate to the voters to have an election campaign during the Christmas vacation period," said Niels Helveg Petersen.

Poul Schluter lifted the veil on his election plans after Tuesday's cabinet meeting. At the same time he made it clear that if necessary the government will present an economic intervention before the election.

"If we have a fall election--probably in the late fall--the government will consider in advance whether an adjustment of economic policy will be needed," said Poul Schluter.

No Plans to Intervene

Poul Schluter denied the need for economic intervention at this time.

"I have not heard anyone say that an economic policy adjustment is necessary. National Bank director Erik Hoffmeyer warned last week against intervening too late and we agree with that. The government would rather intervene a little too early than too late," Poul Schluter said.

"We must evaluate the effect of the contracts in the next few months and at the same time we must closely study the balance of payments trend. But if the positive development that has taken place in the last 4 months continues, there will be no need for an intervention," said Poul Schluter.

Priorities

The government and the Radical Liberals have recently come on a collision course concerning the contents of the 1988 budget in which all state expenditures and revenues are spelled out.

There has been a demand to set sharp spending priorities and the government will not budge from the principle that new expenditures in one area must be offset by savings somewhere else. However the government will not disclose at this time what the concrete priorities will be.

"The government will establish priorities. The result will become known when we present the 1988 budget proposal. This will happen around 15 August," said Poul Schluter.

He denied that the hybrid network and the Great Belt link are investments that put a strain on public budgets.

"Both are investments that will produce a surplus," said Poul Schluter.

Poll Indicates Conservatives Gaining

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 1 Mar 87 p 7

[Article by Thorkild Dahl: "Schluter Favored as Prime Minister"; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE TIDENDE introduction]

[Text] The Progressive Party would win the decisive votes in Folketing if we had an election at this time, thus producing "Schluter's nightmare." The Social Democratic-SF alternative to the nonsocialist government could not assemble a majority.

Poul Schluter (Conservative) would continue to be prime minister if we held an election now. A Gallup poll shows that the Social Democratic-SF alternative could not win a majority and thus ensure itself of government power.

However an election now would give the Progressives more seats and put the party in a position to tip the political scales on decisive votes, a situation that has been called Schluter's nightmare in Christiansborg—one in which the Progressive Party has the decisive votes.

Prime Minister Poul Schluter has not concealed the view that the Progressive delegates are extremely unreliable partners and Mogens Glistrup's heirs have not been invited to the prime minister's office since the Rio Bravo compromise in the fall of 1983. In informal talks members of the Progressive Party have made no secret of the fact that the decisive votes would be used.

The survey was carried out while people were filling out their income tax returns and the Progressive Party regained the support of some of the voters who had abandoned the party. The Social Democrats and the Socialist People's Party picked up support as a result of the intensified debate on the environment, while among the government parties, Environmental Affairs Minister Christian Christensen's party made a slight gain and Agricultural Minister Britta Schall Holberg's party, the Liberals, registered a decline.

The Gallup poll would give the government 86 seats in cooperation with the Radical Liberals while the Social Democratic-Socialist People's Party alternative would get 82 seats. The Left-Socialist Party [VS] failed once again to pass the cutoff barrier and the Social Democratic decline could not be offset by the SF advance.

Distribution of Folketing Seats

<u>Party</u>	<u>Poll</u>	<u>1984 Election</u>
Social Democrats	57	56
Radical Liberals	9	10
Conservatives	43	42
Socialist People's Party	28	21
Center-Democrats	6	8
Christian People's Party	5	5
Liberals	22	22
Left-Socialists	0	5
Progressives	5	6

Political Index

Question: Which party would you vote for if we had a Folketing election tomorrow?

Survey conducted 7-22 February 1987.

Party	<u>10 Jan</u> <u>1984</u>	<u>Sep</u> <u>1986</u>	<u>Oct</u> <u>1986</u>	<u>Nov</u> <u>1986</u>	<u>Dec</u> <u>1986</u>	<u>Jan</u> <u>1987</u>	<u>Feb</u> <u>1987</u>
Social Democrats	31.6%	29.5%	30.4%	31.2%	31.7%	31.3%	29.4%
Radical Liberals	5.5	5.0	3.7	5.6	6.1	5.1	5.1
Conservatives	23.4	24.7	23.1	23.8	23.0	23.3	23.9
Single-Tax Party	1.5	--	--	--	--	--	--
Socialist							
People's Party	11.5	16.3	18.1	14.2	12.9	15.2	15.3
Green Party	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Humanist Party	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Int. Socialist							
Workers Party	0.1	--	--	--	--	--	--
Communists	0.7	--	--	--	--	--	--
Marxist-Leninists	0.0	--	--	--	--	--	--
Center-Democrats	4.6	3.1	2.6	4.9	3.6	3.3	3.9
Christian							
People's Party	2.7	2.4	2.9	--	2.2	2.7	3.0
Liberals	12.1	12.5	12.3	11.9	11.9	11.8	11.2
Left-Socialists	2.7	--	--	--	2.5	--	--
Progressives	3.6	3.6	2.3	--	3.4	2.5	4.0
Other parties*	--	2.9	4.6	8.4	2.7	4.8	4.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

* Parties with less than 2 percent of the votes.

Reproduction permitted if Gallup and BERLINGSKE TIDENDE are cited as sources.

Paper Advises Election Delay

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 1 Mar 87 p 14

[Editorial: "Gambling With Nonsocialist Majority"]

[Text] Prime Minister Poul Schluter is hearing a lot of good--and bad--advice these days about the best time to schedule the next election. Right now--a shock election based on the argument that the profile-polluted political atmosphere needs to be cleaned up in order to restore government agreement and calm down the stock market? Or should he wait until May when the environmental plan is approved? Or until August when the 1988 budget

proposal is submitted? Or until October in connection with the opening of Folketing? Or until December, when hopefully the government and the Radical Liberals have again reached an agreement on the budget?

Last Sunday the prime minister said in this paper that it is still the government's goal to make use of the election period "entirely or almost entirely." Other government politicians say the same thing in official remarks. Unofficially they make no secret of the fact that in recent weeks there have been internal discussions about whether it would be tactically wiser to hold an election at the beginning--or end--of the summer. Everyone realizes that neither the environmental dispute nor the present economic trend of continued high interest rates provides a good basis for an early election. On the other hand: Who can guarantee that even bigger internal problems will not arise before a fall election and that economic trends will be more favorable then? The uncertainty led the chairman of the Danish Chamber of Commerce, Aage Rask-Pedersen, to call last week for an immediate election. "The restlessness on the stock market and falling investments in the business sector indicate that it would be appropriate to have an election as soon as possible," he said. The statement would be very understandable if there was a prospect of an election victory for the government parties here and now. But that is not the case. On the contrary. All the opinion polls--including the latest Gallup poll published in this newspaper--indicate that the government and the Radical Liberals would lose their slim majority if they held the election now, making them dependent on the Progressive Party again--or, even worse, that the Social Democrats would regain government power with the support of SF and--who knows?--perhaps Common Course, under Preben Moller Hansen's leadership.

Against that background it would be gambling with the nonsocialist majority to speed up the date of the coming election. It should be held at the earliest when the government parties have demonstrated for some months that they again have the determination and the ability to cooperate--and that they can continue to do so in the next election period. On the other hand this demonstration cannot occur soon enough. The Gallup poll shows that the voters have rewarded the Conservative Party, the government party that has stressed its own profile the least at the expense of the other coalition parties. This should help to encourage all four parties to resume immediately--better late than never--the fight to get the government re-elected.

6578

CSO: 3613/48

BOOK EXAMINES HISTORY OF SDP SECURITY POLICY

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 26 Feb 87 p 16

[Review by Jukka-Pekka Pietiainen of book "Puolueettomuuden ja Rauhan Linja" [Neutrality and Peace Policy] by Osmo Hyytia, Finnish Historical Society, 1987; first paragraph is HELSINGIN SANOMAT introduction]

[Text] The SDP [Social Democratic Party] security policy began to exert its influence shortly after the Civil War.

Osmo Hyytia's dissertation, which surveys the SDP's views on security policy between 1918 and 1922, must inevitably be compared with Juhani Mylly's two-part study "The Agrarian League and Security Policy."

The starting point for Hyytia's investigation of security issues is very much the same as that of Mylly and other students of political history in Turku like Juhani Paasivirta and Timo Soikkanen. He too approaches the object of his study from the viewpoint of a total security policy.

Hyytia follows Juhani Mylly's classification, according to which a total security policy can be divided into internal security factors (defense policy and domestic policy) and external security factors (foreign relations and the international system).

Hyytia does not approach his subject from a theoretical viewpoint. The study is actually a very conventional, one might say traditional history of politics. The study is not, however, limited to an investigation of foreign policy alone. On the other hand, in studying a party that is outside the government as a factor in our security policy, Hyytia looks at events in a way that differs from the viewpoint adopted in the official security policy: the entire spectrum of SDP opinion. In such a study the press occupies an important position.

Pink Party Leadership

After the Civil War those men who had not participated in the attempted revolution acceded to the leadership of the SDP. At the end of the 1920's the party leadership was in the hands of conservative Social Democrats. They had to wage the political battle on many fronts. That is why SDP views on security policy were more dependent on the immediate situation than ideological.

Hyytia's study reinforces the image of the Social Democrats as a very national party. The SDP has always evaluated security policy issues on the basis of national considerations. This has involved--as Hyytia demonstrates--a goodly measure of tactics, but also a fair amount of realism.

The political Right felt that a strong defense establishment would be a safeguard of Finland's independence. In the opinion of the nonsocialist parties, Soviet Russia constituted a permanent threat. In the opinion of the SDP, that threat was not self-evident.

The Soviet Government was the only Russian faction that had recognized Finland's independence. The Social Democrats saw a greater danger in the White Russians. The Social Democrats opposed intervention. We did not have the moral right to interfere with the internal affairs of another country.

On the other hand, relations between the two nations were to be distinguished from the attitude we assumed toward Bolshevism. The SDP supported making peace with Soviet Russia. Tanner's personal initiative undoubtedly furthered the conclusion of the peace treaty in Tartu, no matter what opinion we may have of his methods. Hyytia is of the opinion that the party leadership had to achieve peace because of the criticism of the Left wing. The SDP was indeed the only party that was satisfied with the peace treaty. It held the conservatives, but also the government, responsible for the bad relations between Finland and Soviet Russia.

Volunteer Militia Were Opponents

In the opinion of the SDP, the attitude toward Soviet Russia that had been adopted meant that the Finns had to try to safeguard their independence first and foremost through political means. Nordic neutrality was the goal. In that way we could be detached from superpower politics, which we had had unpleasant experiences with during the Civil War.

Conforming to the principle of absolute neutrality, the Social Democrats reacted negatively to a union of the border states and defeated Foreign Minister Holst, who had promoted it.

The SDP's views on defense policy were strongly marked by domestic politics. The defense establishment, the heir to the White Army, and the volunteer militia were regarded as opponents in domestic politics. Their importance in terms of national defense was pooh-poohed.

The SDP recognized the legitimacy of national defense and advocated a so-called people's militia system instead of the permanent cadre system. The Social Democrats doubted that Finland had sufficient resources. The country's independence would not be protected through preparations involving military means. Finland's independence had to be consolidated from within.

It was possible to reduce defense expenditures. These funds could be channeled into social reforms. The leveling of social differences, the elevation of our cultural level and a social reform effort would consolidate our independence.

Right of Self-Determination

The SDP had to define its practical position on nationality issues in connection with the kindred peoples policy and the Aland issue. It adopted the principle of national self-determination.

The SDP supported the annexation of Eastern Karelia to Finland, not through a policy of military adventurism, but peacefully as an expression of the free will of the population. After the Tartu peace treaty, in the party's opinion, Finland only had the right to demand implementation of the self-government that had been agreed upon.

A more clearly national interest became evident in connection with the Aland issue. The SDP wanted to resolve the question as to whether Aland would belong to Finland or to Sweden through a popular referendum of the Alanders. That did not, however, take place until several years later when things had calmed down. Before that happened, Aland was to be granted broad, provincial self-government, which was supposed to eliminate the grounds for separatism.

When Sweden appealed to the peace conference, the situation changed. It was no longer a mutual agreement between Finland and Sweden. The SDP switched to the position of national interest and was surprised at the position assumed by Sweden's Social Democrats. It was a troublesome situation for the SDP since the Aland issue was preventing it from achieving Nordic neutrality, the foreign policy line aimed at by the party. The SDP was satisfied with the solution arrived at by the League of Nations.

Party Increases Its Influence

All things considered, Hyytia's study does not introduce much that is new, but it does focus on details. His viewpoint is very Social Democratic.

Hyytia does not much consider the alternatives the party leadership had. For example, the way it reacted to Estonia's struggle for independence or the Eastern Karelia issue was the only sensible way for it to react. Hyytia does not indicate that the party leadership always pursued the tactically speaking wisest policy.

Hyytia's dissertation shows that he is very familiar with the histories of both the Social Democrats and Finnish foreign policy. Hyytia is a reliable scholar.

In addition to the national character of the SDP, Hyytia unnoticed establishes the truth of an oft forgotten fact: that the party's influence was in fact very great precisely during the early years of independence. Particularly with security policy issues, developments moved very much in the direction it hoped for.

The March 1919 elections brought the SDP back as the biggest delegation in Parliament. Approval of a democratic form of government and the election of Stahlberg as president broke the power of the conservatives and launched the centrist policy backed by the SDP.

The Center parties were trying to lessen social differences. For that reason the government sought and received support from the SDP. Hyytia raises this to the level of foreign policy reasons. The SDP wanted a centrist government to prevent a conservative adventurist policy and succeeded in doing so.

SORSA URGES 'CONTROLLED' INTERNATIONALIZATION OF ECONOMY

Problems in World Trend

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 9 Feb 87 p 8

[Article: "Sorsa: National Self-Assurance As a Guiding Principle; 'Businesses Must Be Internationalized in a Controlled Manner'"]

[Text] The chairman of the SDP [Social Democratic Party], Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa, has stressed the importance of the controlled internationalization of Finland's economy. According to Sorsa, the world economic policy pursued by the big industrial nations seeks more room to maneuver for capital by making use of a rapidly expanding channel of technology.

In Sorsa's opinion, no more so than the international organizations they have created, national governments do not really seem to be keeping up with developments. These nations are not prepared to turn over to the organizations that portion of their national decision-making right absolutely necessary for the organizations to be able to supervise multinational companies' operations.

Discussing internationalization at the Vaasa District's 80th anniversary celebration of the founding of the SDP on Sunday, Sorsa underlined the fact that reciprocal growth with the rest of the world is of paramount importance for Finland's future. He felt that it is just as important for internationalization to take place in accordance with and reinforcing the conditions of our national identity.

Combined with tough competition, the liberation of international trade and capital movements have, according to Sorsa, led to sizable reorganizations of big companies in Finland too.

"We are participating in tough, worldwide competition, but with a very small stake. If we invest what we have unwisely, we lose the game."

Cry of the Wild Duck Drowned Out

According to Sorsa, we cannot exert much influence on the rules of the game. We can only comment wisely to one another on the lack of fair play and the sacrifices demanded of the small players.

"No outsider will listen to us anyway. Our cry is drowned out by the wind of the world--like the cry of the wild duck," Sorsa described Finland's situation.

Sorsa feels that the course international economic developments are taking is fraught with problems. In his opinion, we must nevertheless participate in things and on our own strive to achieve reforms that will correct the course of events.

Rejects EC Full Membership

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 27 Feb 87 p 11

[Article: "Sorsa Announces Unmistakable Stance: Finland Cannot Join EC"]

[Text] In Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa's estimation, in terms of economic unification we in Europe are facing a new phase and Finland too must in its own interest participate in the shaping of Europe's economic future. Membership in the European Community (EC) is, however, impossible for Finland.

"Our relations with the EC will in the future as well conform to the foreign policy neutrality line we have established. Membership in the EC is an alternative that is excluded for any country that wants to preserve its neutrality. That organization is important for us and it is a valued partner in economic exchanges and cooperation, but its political goals are not our goals," Sorsa said in the extensive lecture on international policy he gave at the University of Helsinki on Thursday.

In it Sorsa examined changes in the international situation primarily from the Finnish viewpoint. One of these conspicuous changes is, according to Sorsa, taking place in connection with the economic unification of Europe. Relations between the East European countries and the EC as well as between the EFTA countries and the EC are changing. According to Sorsa, we need to discuss European policy now.

While Finland cannot join the EC as a member, according to Sorsa, Finland plans to develop commercial and economic cooperation with the EC area "by constantly responding to new challenges."

"We cannot let ourselves get into a weaker position than our competitors nor let ourselves be discriminated against."

According to Sorsa, Finland is fully participating in research and technology collaboration, but, "naturally, we do not go along with applications of military technology."

Trade Boycott with the Force of Law

In Sorsa's opinion, joint actions with the United Nations to boycott South Africa are not now being considered.

Because of this there is reason for Finland to consider "giving the South African Government an absolutely clear political signal and for making a ban on

trade binding through legal steps." Sorsa noted that we must not, however, break off trade with South Africa at the expense of the nations bordering on South Africa.

"When oppression gets to be as brutal as it is in South Africa now, it becomes difficult to observe the rules of international trade. Defending the rights of the oppressed is just humanism, not trade," the prime minister and chairman of the SDP stated.

Concerning superpower relations, Sorsa among other things noted that the results of the nuclear arms talks between the United States and the Soviet Union will determine the course these relations take.

"In particular the new dynamism and unbiased attitude of the Soviet leadership, to which the West should now have the good sense to respond, are giving rise to hopes. This dialogue is also building a framework for our country's security policy.

"We know that the United States and the Soviet Union are close to an agreement involving drastic cuts--as much as 50 percent--in strategic offensive weapons. This would be a gigantic step and the first real disarmament action," Sorsa remarked.

In his opinion, a turning point occurred in the history of nuclear weapons at the Reykjavik summit conference: The superpowers put reduction of nuclear weapons on the political agenda.

The prime minister emphasized that the nuclear weapons reductions to be agreed on should also affect armament in northern waters. A continued arms buildup in maritime areas might increase the likelihood of a crisis and of instability, and that would not be in the interests of the security of Northern Europe.

11,466

CSO: 3617/66

COUNTRY'S FIRMS URGED TO STUDY USSR JOINT VENTURE POTENTIAL

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 3 Mar 87 p 29

[Commentary by Kustaa Hulkko: "Joint Ventures Still in the Air"; first paragraph is HELSINGIN SANOMAT introduction]

[Text] For a capitalist a joint venture in a socialist country is an unprecedented risk. The management of raw materials and energy is not always effective in a system based on practical socialism. A high tariff wall is often raised against goods manufactured in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's natural resources and markets are inexhaustible. Our neighbor is also the promised land for the natural sciences and technology. Through joint ventures Finland would benefit from advanced research.

A big diplomatic operation involving trade policy has been in progress in the Soviet Union these past few months. Its purpose is to establish joint ventures with Western capitalists. Our neighbor has negotiated with dozens of firms and persuaded them to make rapid decisions.

Not a single joint venture has, however, yet been established; projects are only in the offing. It may yet be weeks before the first venture is established.

From the viewpoint of Western firms the land of the Soviets is unknown territory into which they dare not set foot before it is thoroughly mapped. The joint venture domain is yet to be staked out in the Soviet Union too. The drafting of legal and economic reforms is incomplete.

Aside from East Germany, the Soviet Union is the last socialist country to begin to experiment with joint ventures. Ideological reasons have prevented the fatherland of socialism from bringing capitalist capital onto its soil.

Who?

Foreign Trade Minister Boris Aristov discussed joint ventures with the Finns for the first time last summer. The discussions did not pick up speed until last November when the CPSU's number-two man, Yegor Ligachev, visited Finland. Ligachev invited Finland's top Soviet trade officials and industrialists to the Kremlin.

Joint ventures have been accorded favorable expression in Finland's official statements, among others in Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa's speech delivered at the inauguration of Tallinn's [new] port. It has been emphasized that forming them will primarily be the business of private firms.

In January Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov said in Helsinki that there would be about 20 Finnish-Soviet ventures. Farthest along are Finnair and Sadolin, which have concluded preliminary agreements. Finnair will be managing a hotel and Sadolin will be participating in the manufacture of wood preservatives.

The EKA [not further identified] combine has signed an agreement with the Soviets stating its intention to refine petrochemical waste materials, and Valio and Enso [Gutzeit] have discussed projects in their own fields with them.

According to Soviet reports, preliminary agreements have also been concluded by Outokumpu for the processing of scrap iron, by Kati Sales for the manufacture of women's clothing and by Rosenlew for the manufacture of polymer containers.

What?

The establishment of joint ventures requires complicated agreements, profitability and financing calculations and marketing and production plans. International consulting firms have drawn up checklists containing many dozens of items. Finnish industry has also made up its own list of potential problems and objectives designed to resolve them.

The model proffered by the Soviet Union aims for a company that will manufacture industrial products or produce services. It is a categorical condition that the general manager be a Soviet.

Another principle that they refuse to compromise on is that the Soviet partner, be it a firm or some other organization, always retains a controlling position, at least a 51-percent share in the venture.

The foreign partner will be permitted to repatriate its share of the profits. The joint venture may itself control its prices and will be free of the planning bureaucracy. The Soviet Union will at the same time require the company to earn its own foreign exchange revenue through exports of its products.

Why?

Joint ventures are a part of the Soviet Union's economic reform, a key aspect of which is improvement of foreign trade. The Soviets want to raise their country to the level of a superpower of world trade as well. These past few months they have often noted that their country's share of world trade is only 4 percent, even though it accounts for 20 percent of world industrial production.

The goal is to procure "progressive foreign techniques and technology, management experience, material and monetary reserves for the country and to improve the country's export base and cut down on inexpedient foreign imports" through joint ventures, as the government organ IZVESTIYA puts it.

Soviet journalist Gennadiy Pisarevski recently wrote that they have certainly never before engaged in as heated controversies as now in the country's field of economics. Economists openly discuss the costs and benefits of foreign technology. Singling out the experiences of the 1970's, they point out that some of the foreign equipment that was bought was unnecessary, some of it too expensive and only some of it really fulfilled its function. Thus criticism is being indirectly leveled at the idea of joint ventures as well.

In the West too they somewhat suspect that there are motives other than rational ones as well behind the Soviet leadership's enthusiasm for joint ventures. Aside from being a specific economic objective, "the joint venture" is also a watchword with the aid of which they are creating spirit and organizing the masses.

Why Not?

We may perhaps say that "moving toward socialism"--even if only as a partner in a joint venture--is the most radical change imaginable in the operational environment for a capitalist.

Even if we should manage to conclude profitable agreements, it may be difficult to find a common language with our Soviet partners in the future. There is a system in Soviet Russia that has been in operation for over 50 years and which lacks real markets. Other than the people of the Baltic states, they cannot even remember what it is like to take business risks.

A capitalist regards capital differently than a Soviet does. First, a capitalist sets strict yield requirements for a business. Second, depletion and replacement constitute an essential way of renewing production potential. Only 2.5 percent of the machines and equipment a year are replaced in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's isolation in terms of trade policy is also a troublesome point. The country is already running into a high tariff wall in Western Europe. For example, it is hard to competitively price machines and equipment if the highest tariffs are in the tens of percents.

The Soviet Union has emphasized that joint ventures will operate subject to the country's labor laws. About these we know only that there are more than enough technical provisions and standards governing labor and environmental protection.

Nor is there any accurate information on the cost of labor either. Estonian officials report that labor costs are on the whole almost as high as in Finland.

In the Soviet newspapers there are often news items that report on the difficulties they have in obtaining raw materials. There are problems in supplying energy: Interruptions in the distribution of electric current occasionally paralyze plant operations. Rail shipments are one of the system's bottlenecks: The network is overburdened.

The foreign exchange risk is one of the risks of a joint venture. In connection with every year-end balance, for example, they have to decide which exchange rate to use to convert rubles into Western currency. The problem is a

tough one since the ruble is not a foreign exchange currency nor will it become one in the near future. Besides, the ruble clearly runs the risk of being devalued.

Where?

The Soviet Union has proposed a company that would specifically operate in the Soviet Union. The Finns have also proposed another kind of model, the so-called Shotton model. According to it, the joint venture would be established in Finland, even though the plant itself would be built in the Soviet Union.

The Finns would hold a majority share of the company and the general manager would be a Finn. The joint venture would function primarily as a management and marketing unit. Goods would be manufactured in the plant, wholly owned by the Soviet partner, which the company would only lease for its own use.

The joint venture would be responsible for the funding, construction and operation of the plant. The Soviet partner would, on the other hand, provide the workers, the site, electricity, water, raw materials, transport and plant management.

According to the plan, the marketing of exports would be turned over to the Finns.

They think that the model would, for example, work in the forestry industry. Part of the production would go to the Soviet Union and the Soviets would handle sales. The joint venture would import part of the production into Finland in accordance with bilateral trade terms. Some of it would go to Western Europe or elsewhere through Finnish firms' marketing channels on a Western currency basis.

One of the objectives of Western companies has been for them to be able to expand their markets into the Soviet Union or other socialist countries. This is not excluded. However, the Soviet Union's chief goal is to either compensate for imports or generate exports to the West for which it will obtain foreign exchange revenue. Thus the Western partner in a joint venture would obviously often be competing with himself.

Finnish experts have stated that good areas for setting up joint ventures are the Baltic republics or areas in general located close to the border.

According to Soviet Dr Yuriy D. Shcherbina, they would at first hope to exploit their machine construction and chemical industries and minerals, as well as consumer goods and food production, among others.

How?

According to the Moscow model, the personnel would be Soviets with the exception of foreign managers and specialists.

The joint venture would be able to borrow rubles as well as foreign currency from either the Soviet Foreign Trade Bank or the foreign country. The joint venture would trade with foreign countries in foreign currencies and in rubles

inside the Soviet Union. Prices and foreign exchange account interest rates would be determined by "the world market," an expression the Soviets frequently employ in the text of their agreements. How world market prices are to be determined is another matter.

According to the Soviet plan, the joint venture would in the beginning be allowed a 2-year exemption from taxes. The taxes imposed would be fairly stiff: 30 percent on profits and an additional 20 percent on the portion repatriated by the partner.

When?

The Soviet Government has come to a decision on the general guidelines for joint ventures. We are now waiting for it to provide more specific guidelines for the application of the provisions thus far published. The process may yet take weeks, perhaps even months.

In Finland the experts also think that it pays to go to the trouble of thoroughly investigating joint ventures. One of the key arguments in favor of the idea is a mutual relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union that would guarantee us a good competitive position in comparison with the other capitalist countries.

The Soviet trade representative in Finland, V.D. Pugin, recently proposed that the two countries look into the establishment of a joint venture for the exchange of technical know-how and consulting services. The company might also handle the trade in licenses. Finns at present buy more licenses from the Soviet Union than they export to our neighbor.

In the field of physics, for example, the Soviet Union is one of the leading countries in the world. In the scientific community in Siberia they are constantly inventing devices that do not go beyond prototypes. The Soviets themselves say that it would take them 10 years to get their innovations into mass production. In connection with this, Finns' contribution could be the know-how for getting scientific and technical inventions into production.

11,466

CSO: 3617/67

PAPER ANALYZES LABOR SITUATION

Unemployment Estimates

Paris LIBERATION in French 26 Feb 87 p 5

[Article by Martine Gilson]

[Text] Following a bad month in December, the employment picture in January turned very nasty. In seasonally adjusted figures, France had 2,612,500 jobseekers last month. That is 38,400 more than in December--a rise of 1.5 percent since the month before and of 7 percent over a 1-year period. In all, 10.9 percent of the active French population lined up at the ANPE [National Employment Agency] last month, compared to 10.7 percent in December.

To justify those very bad results, the communique issued by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment mentions not only some real demographic factors but also "the difficulties encountered by the firms in January 1987"--meaning, in plain language, strikes. The explanation is the usual one, but a wee bit simplistic, since from now on, in the eyes of the government, it will justify the rise in prices and unemployment and the foreign trade deficit.

If we take a more serious and lingering look at the figures published yesterday, we see that the youth employment program has caused unemployment among those under 25 years of age to drop. In January, 857,600 in that age group checked in at the ANPE, reflecting a drop of 0.3 percent in the case of young men and of 0.7 percent in the case of young women.

On the other hand, things grew sharply worse for the unemployed between the ages of 25 and 49. They numbered 1,360,900 last month, both sexes combined, reflecting an increase of 11.7 percent among men and of 17.8 percent among women. This is clearly a result of "substitution" (see the article on page 4 [not included]). When firms hire young people (including those hired before they are needed) to qualify for 25-percent tax exemptions, they leave older workers, who are growing more and more numerous, without a job.

Another interesting element, if we can put it that way, is the number of jobseekers registered with the ANPE as a result of layoffs: there were 64,244 in January, or 13.6 percent more than in December and nearly 20 percent more

than 1 year earlier. Since the figure has been rising steadily since early fall, it is reasonable to think that the reason is the law of 3 July, which eliminated the need to obtain government authorization for layoffs. And since the number of new applicants registering with the ANPE because their fixed-term contracts had expired was up by 5 percent over the previous month, the January figures confirm that those first reforms in the field of employment have become an everyday feature of the labor market.

Let us add to this picture the number of jobseekers registered with the ANPE for over a year: 830,409 in January (+2.3 percent since the month before and nearly 12 percent more than a year earlier). It is easy to see why meetings by ministers to deal with this burning topic--the latest of those meetings was held yesterday (see page 2 [not included])--have been increasing in number.

If Philippe Seguin is determined to find grounds for satisfaction despite his legendary--and carefully cultivated--singing of the blues, he can always cast an eye on the increase in the number of wage earners, which rose by 0.4 percent between 31 December 1985 and 31 December 1986. The only problem is that for the past 2 months, those figures have included young people in introductory vocational training programs, which are one of the various training alternatives. It is hard to regard them as really reflecting the creation of new jobs.

Strike Limitations Imposed

Paris L'USINE NOUVELLE in French 8 Jan 87 p 49

[Article by Sylvie Bommel]

[Text] The economic crisis and changes in social relations had already brought about a very noticeable decline in the number of strikes against the firms. But several months ago, the courts began carrying things further. By placing stricter limits on the right to strike, the judges are in fact encouraging the union organizations to think twice before calling a strike.

For instance, there was the recent decision by the court of appeal in Angers ordering four CGT representatives to pay their firm (LTR Industries) 770,000 francs in damages for having "disorganized production" when they ordered work stoppages by the personnel. That decision was right in line with one last January which ordered 13 CGT militants at the Aulnay factory, including Akka Ghazzi, to pay 1 million francs to Citroen--a first.

Although apparently obvious, the reasoning by the judges was nonetheless innovative. Were it not for the accompanying interference with the right to work, neither strike would have had more than a minor effect on the company's smooth operation, because the strikers were so few in number that their action could not have disorganized production. The harm suffered by the employer in terms of lost production was therefore a direct consequence of the offense. That immediately leaves the strikers open to civil action by their employer. But also by the nonstrikers if the latter lodge a complaint. It was the Delsey case of March 1986 which cleared the way on that point. In

that case, 24 strikers were ordered to pay 252,000 francs to the Association for the Defense of Nonstriking Wage Earners as compensation for the days of work lost! "Out of a concern to restore good feeling," the nonstrikers eventually waived payment of the damages. But that does not always happen. Last April, for example, the district court in Dreux ordered attachment of the wages of 10 union representatives to enforce a judgment ordering them to pay 400,000 francs to 335 nonstrikers at the RTC-Compelec plant.

The conviction of the union representatives at the CGFTE in Nancy is more symbolic but nonetheless revealing. During a strike action supported by 70 percent of the company's drivers, three CGT and FO [Workers Force] representatives took it upon themselves to post the names of nonstrikers. That was ruled moral injury, and damages were set at 1,000 francs for each of the 22 nonstrikers.

Parallel with the changes that have occurred in strike methods, judges have just placed two new conditions on the legality of strikes. First, the right to strike is subject to "the existence of previously established occupational demands which the employer has refused to satisfy." Second, it must be concerned with demands which are not excessive and which can reasonably be satisfied. In a decree dated 4 July 1986, the Court of Cassation ruled that a strike organized by flight personnel against Air France, Air Inter, and the UTA [Air Transport Union] to protest a government decision was improper. In that case, the companies had no possibility of satisfying the demand.

Those court decisions are all the more interesting in that they constitute the only point of reference with respect to the right to strike. On that subject, and contrary to its usual approach, the Labor Code is almost silent.

11798

CSO: 3519/86

LUBBERS ON UNEMPLOYMENT, WAGES, ECONOMIZING, LABOR PARTY

Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT in Dutch 21 Feb 87 supplement p 1

[Interview with Prime Minister Lubbers by Arendo Joustra and Erik van Venetie: "We Are Not Engaged in the Great Dismantling"; date and place not given; first three paragraphs are DE VOLKSKRANT introduction]

[Text] The departments must be fluffed up like a pillow, thinks Lubbers. Arendo Joustra and Erik van Venetie in discussion with the prime minister. A discussion of the slight decrease in unemployment and of potentially stronger sanctions against the long-time unemployed. And also of Wim Kok and the angry looks from the CDA benches.

The prime minister has a big red nose. Jupiter, the Roman supreme god who begot thunder and lightning, rain and sunshine, has a cold. "Usually I have one twice every winter, but this time I haven't had one yet." Also in other respects things aren't going well for Prime Minister Rudolphus Franciscus Maria Lubbers (47): With the Provincial States elections close at hand, the decrease in unemployment is starting to waver. In 3 weeks' time the prime minister must account for that in the Second Chamber, but he says he hasn't found a fitting solution yet. "We are now in the stage of analysis," he starts the discussion. That turns out to be a diversion. Prime Minister Lubbers ("Shall I say something about it?") wants more commitment in the labor market. "We must build in additional tougher elements."

The debate with PvdA Parliamentary Group Leader Kok ("He has become more aggressive") and the elections of 18 March cause Lubbers less anxiety than the discussion with employers and workers starting at the end of March. "What is the reason for our job plans to get going so slowly? That will emphatically be the topic of discussion with the social partners. Is everything simply taking more time than we expect, or do we have to opt for the Swedish type of strict welfare state? More obligatory elements, otherwise we won't get there."

[Question] That has already been tried more often, but it failed.

[Lubbers] "There are waves, but at a certain moment the indiscussible must become discussible. A stricter sanction policy for those who refuse work that is offered to them. But we must also be able to talk about that with

employers. CAO's [Collective Labor Agreements], for example, could include employers' having to hire for a part of their vacancies people who have been unemployed for more than a year, whereby one could think in terms of a fixed percentage. Why should that not be possible? In the past, CAO's included stipulations on safety and on subcontractors of laborers."

[Question] Not only the results of the job plans are disappointing, but also the work time shortening is stagnating. And shared jobs don't work too well any longer.

[Lubbers] "The general ATV [work time shortening] has become very controversial. The obstacles have been inventoried; only, they have not been solved. Consequently we are bogged down. In the government accord we already staked little on ATV, thus it would not be correct to call that the main reason for the disappointment in the fight against unemployment."

[Question] In the central debate, you want to put special emphasis on a moderation in wage costs. Aren't you neglecting the wage measure weapon?

[Lubbers] "We have a rather calm approach, and we should have more than one string to our bow. We must explain how important wage moderation is for job opportunity. But we must also accommodate the wage moderation in the total package. If employers and workers say, for example, that with a view to economic growth and work opportunity the cabinet must invest in road construction, we can ask if they in turn will agree with wage moderation.

"And we must appeal to solidarity. If wages are moderated, the uncoupling from benefits will be kept to a minimum. As far as I am concerned, that uncoupling can be brought back to zero. For that matter, in the previous cabinet period also, we had no other weapon but our arguments, and the wages also remained moderate."

[Question] But at that time there was wage moderation primarily because of the work time shortening.

[Lubbers] "The point is indeed that workers should get something in exchange for that wage moderation, something that is comparable to ATV, for example the possibility for early retirement. The money available for wage increase can also be spent on training programs, even though that is asking a lot of solidarity. One should not put too much weight on that training. I think that few workers are interested in yet another rotation day [free day in lieu of cost of living compensation] or in working one hour less. It is now primarily a matter of preserving job opportunity and of bringing in the unemployed.

"I am somewhat interested in the proposals of the CNV [National Federation of Christian Workers in the Netherlands]. In a company with 1000 workers, one can make room for 50 new people through 5 percent ATV. Now that the ATV has become mired, one could instead decide to establish a trade school, a training class for 50 people. That is even better for work opportunity, since with ATV

one has to wait and see whether those 50 new workers do indeed materialize. As to the grade school, I definitely see 50. This is of course an artificial example, but it does point the way."

[Question] One could also keep wage costs down by decreasing the premiums which employers must pay for their employees, couldn't one?

[Lubbers] "That would indeed commit them. But then they must not start rattling their money bags to lure experts away from each other. Surely it would have a reverse effect to decrease the employers' burdens and subsequently to see that they use that space to pay their workers more."

[Question] How can that be prevented?

[Lubbers] "We need the workers for that."

[Question] But if they do bite, nothing will come of wage moderation.

[Lubbers] "You could couple a potential tax decrease to the degree to which it is moderated. The wage moderation in one year is compensated by a tax decrease in the following year. Then it can become a process which reinforces itself. To achieve that, an accord for several years would be needed, however."

[Question] Last fall employers and workers were not terribly keen on entering into an accord.

[Lubbers] After the agreement of last May, there was a period of euphoria among both employers and workers. Both expected things to go well for them. The employers felt no need for joint agreements, and among workers, specifically in the FNV [Netherlands Trade Unions Federation], there was an enormous concentration inward, on its own problems--the mutual differences of opinion, member recruitment--but perhaps too little on work opportunity.

"I hope that the climate for a discussion with employers and workers is better now. In that respect, the disappointing unemployment figures are a blessing in disguise. They bog down both the social partners and ourselves; we really must come up with an answer now."

[Question] Did you look up any unemployed recently?

[Lubbers] "I still believe that that wording in the government declaration is correct. Let me give an example. State Secretary Van Houwelingen of Defense sends, via the municipalities, a letter to the youths who were accepted, but not called up, for the military service, announcing that they can still enter the service. Some of them report, some turn out to have found a job, and yet others decline the honor and report for a training program. Everyone is approached personally, as it were. That is what I mean by looking up the unemployed.

"The abstraction of the card file at the employment bureau often has a twofold un motivating effect. Personnel managers have a strong tendency to see long-

term unemployment on the part of an applicant as a negative indication. And the woman or man concerned has the same feeling. At a certain moment one starts believing it. The personnel manager says no one is available, and the long-term unemployed say they can't find anything. Then such a group must be stirred up. That stirring up, that reaching out, can be done more strongly as far as I am concerned, with a little more commitment."

[Question] But how will that work in practice?

[Lubbers] "For example, to tell youths in the youth employment guarantee plan that they don't have a choice, that they can't say 'I'll manage with unemployment benefits.' It is not a matter of merely keeping such a youth occupied, it is also to test him--what exactly does he want? Whether he goes into industry, or training, or whatever. But do something.

"With older people the question is whether they always accept suitable work. The sanction policy--I say it without difficulty--will have to be stiffened. We are in a vicious circle. People say sanctions are useless because there are enough jobs. But if the economy doesn't grow enough because vacancies are not occupied and training programs don't fill up, the vicious circle is complete. Then who could have objections to a stricter sanction policy? Obligation alone is not the key to success. And I don't believe in solving the unemployment problem only through economic recovery. It is clear that more is needed."

[Question] The government declaration states that the government must retreat and attack. The latter is done by looking for the unemployed. Does the welfare state of Minister Brinkman fall under retreat?

There is silence for half a minute. [Lubbers] "It is not a question of the government retreating and then letting the citizen take care of himself. In the welfare state they complement each other. The social ties between them, both the traditional ones and the new ones, also play a role. In museums you see mixed models of government and private individuals. The 'friends of a museum' help with guided tours and sit in information booths, and sometimes a new painting can be bought from the proceeds. It also seems to function better, for it has acquired more the nature of a private business. There is thus a new wave of citizens and companies who want to exert themselves. That offers new possibilities."

[Question] But is it the government which complements the citizens or is it the citizens who must complement the government?

[Lubbers] "As a minister you can't say: 'I'll organize all museums as in the example.' You can promote those developments, however. I admit that sometimes there is friction also. You can't impose that development, in the sense of: We [the government] won't participate in the museums any longer, so just let them flounder.

"That also applies to other essential tasks, such as health care and housing. We want to bring the service as close as possible to the citizen, and the structures must be federalized as little as possible. To renew those

provisions and safeguard them, the economy certainly must grow by 2.5 percent annually. No, we are definitely not engaged in the great dismantling."

[Question] Is the "social elan" of Brinkman actually a suitable term?

[Lubbers] "Well, one could use that term all right. I myself use it too at times, but in itself it doesn't improve anything. I admit that. I gradually realize that that discussion does not benefit from an abstract approach. Perhaps we, as CDA, did that for too long a period. Some useful things are already being done by private individuals, and one must utilize what is available. We must also point to the influence of examples. Such as: 'Gee, how interesting; in Groningen they have a terribly nice project. Can't we do that elsewhere too?'"

[Question] Then shouldn't the cutback operation in the government be reversed, by first looking at what no longer needs to be done, and only then eliminating civil servants' jobs?

[Lubbers] "It is a good opportunity for ministers to scrutinize their departments. It also has something of fluffing up a pillow. It is not a matter of civil servants not working hard enough, but of certain work not being essential. One form after another, that's the way many people think about bureaucracy."

[Question] Doesn't the cutting back get stuck on eliminating cleaning ladies' and chauffeurs' jobs?

[Lubbers] "No, the stairway is swept from the top down. But sometimes it can't be helped. In Agriculture they say that the consultants who advise farmers are extremely useful, that it is an ideal cooperation between the government, farmers, and agencies. Thus nothing should be eliminated there. But others say: when you step into a cafe in a village in Twente or Brabant on any Tuesday morning, you find people congenially drinking coffee at their regular table. They definitely include a number of people from the agricultural advisory service who don't give a very hurried impression. Thus one could manage with a little less there."

"Occasionally people say too easily that the cheese-slicing method is wrong. What worries me on occasion is that a service might be picked out for the cutback which really ought not to be crossed out (Lubbers draws a big X in the air with his right index finger), while silently hoping that society and politics will rise against that."

[Question] For example the Open Air Museum in Arnhem?

[Lubbers] "Perhaps so."

[Question] The picture of the cutbacks taking place in the Hague is rather distorted by that.

[Lubbers] "That is indeed the unfortunate aspect. I am willing to admit that. In cutting back we must take care that it is done as much as possible in the federal government, among civil servants who do not directly do

operative work. For that matter, there are plenty of those in the rest of the country."

[Question] Is the task of the cutback operation--26,000 fewer federal jobs by 1990--more difficult to achieve than the goal of 200,000 fewer unemployed by 1990?

[Lubbers] "Well, let me say: it is a pleasant morning and I am in a good mood. They are target figures, of course. No one can guarantee that the cutback will be achieved everywhere in the prescribed period. A delay might occur here or there and it might take a year longer. In special cases perhaps even 2 years longer."

[Question] Well, all right, perhaps 1 or 2 years longer. You said you didn't want to be prime minister any longer after 1990.

He starts to laugh. [Lubbers] "Cut myself back. Then the cutback operation is complete." He laughs loudly and once again draws an X in the space of his workroom at the Hofvijver. "From now on we'll only do that to vice prime ministers. A very nice one." And then, serious again: "Well, ok, it is not very useful to talk about that."

[Question] Then why did you say it?

[Lubbers] "To show that I see the political business in itself in such a way that one always has the responsibility for 4 years in the Chamber and 4 years in the government, and afterward a clear choice has to be made about continuing or not. I believe that for democracy to work, a continuous flow of people is needed in politics. Precisely to keep the rapport, the capacity for empathy with society, optimal."

[Question] And 8 years is enough?

[Lubbers] "No, I'm not saying that. Besides personal perceptions, the environment also plays a role, of course. Take the Den Uyl example. He certainly had to make the decision on his leaving himself. That was also the case with Van Agt. I can be forced to leave either because of elections or because I don't do something right. But it is also possible that you have to take that initiative because of your position in the party, since it is difficult for others to make that decision. Well, that watchfulness is constantly with me. Hence I make remarks such as: 1990 would be very nice. However, at this moment not everything is of current concern to me."

[Question] Can it become current after the Provincial States elections, if relations between CDA and VVD should become further distorted?

[Lubbers] "I think indeed that the Provincial States elections will also have an impact on national political relations. I hope that we, as coalition, won't lose too much of the result of last year, but government parties usually do have some wear and tear. A slight decrease is becoming noticeable in the

CDA and VVD. If the CDA and VVD were to go below half in the First Chamber, that would have a psychological impact. Earlier I said that I did not expect that. But I'm not repeating that now."

[Question] Why not?

[Lubbers] "At that time also, it was a somewhat tactically inspired remark. When I said: 'the coalition will remain above half,' Kok answered that he didn't consider the result of the Provincial States elections decisive. Since he stated that, I don't need to state so firmly that we will remain above half in the First Chamber."

[Question] And the results?

[Lubbers] "If we go below 50 percent, I won't leave as a result. But it will result in a more difficult political climate. I believe that there will be increasing questionableness as to whether the cabinet's line is the correct one. It is important of course how big the coalition is, how broad the support is."

[Question] You said once that the fierce opposition of Den Uyl during the first Lubbers Cabinet had a consolidating effect. Has Kok's reasonable and constructive opposition affected the homogeneity of the cabinet?

[Lubbers] "I am not too good in that type of psychotherapeutic analysis. It is a fact that Kok clearly proceeded in a different manner than Den Uyl. I think that Kok scored with that the past few months."

[Question] Scored?

[Lubbers] "Yes, because I do see some change in that. Now. At this moment."

[Question] Such as?

[Lubbers] "Kok sometimes makes comments which do not fit in with that reasonable line. That is probably directed at his own electorate in hall X or Y, but it naturally has some outward effect. That can suddenly acquire overtones which then cause polarization and aggressiveness. I don't know whether Kok does that intentionally or whether it just happens. Perhaps people around him hand him little texts and ideas. Moreover, he keeps silent on certain matters, and that can sometimes be very revealing too."

[Question] Minister De Koning said that the PvdA must become more realistic if the party wants to be an acceptable coalition partner in 1990. Just how low should the PvdA actually bow?

[Lubbers] "I found that statement of De Koning rather pithy. I don't think it is a matter of the PvdA not being realistic, even though De Koning is right to a certain extent. I had not expected, for example, that the PvdA would want to reinstate the coupling [of wages and benefits] now. Due to the restructuring, Jan de Koning had to take more blows from the PvdA than I during the previous cabinet period. But Jan de Koning and I don't have any

kind of prejudice against the PvdA because of, how shall I put it, having been treated badly or off-handedly."

[Question] Isn't it difficult to be in opposition to the current cabinet policy?

After a long silence Lubbers says softly, as if he is only just realizing it: "Does one have to be in opposition? That is strange, actually. What exactly do you mean by opposition?" Then, laughing broadly: "I have done many things during those 13 years, but I have never been in the opposition. Thus I can't discuss it too well. I do think, however, that the placing of critical notes in the margin and the offering of alternatives is most rewarding; his Majesty's most loyal opposition."

[Question] But does that really happen?

[Lubbers] "Certainly, except there is a continuous temptation to be even more critical. The PvdA has the disadvantage that it is less to the center than the CDA. We have the possibility of somewhat spreading out unattractive matters. Sometimes to a certain group in education or health care, another time to the typical workers' side, and yet another time a pill for employers. The unattractive things are passed around. The PvdA, which stands on the left and yet must develop a policy for the whole country, per definition is in a more difficult position. Den Uyl struggled with that as prime minister. Drees had more an attitude of: 'I am indeed a socialist, but I am first of all prime minister.'"

[Question] You have that Drees attitude a little with respect to the CDA parliamentary group, don't you?

[Lubbers] "In a number of cases I consciously try to take other positions into account. And, to be honest, that sometimes causes tensions. Sometimes I get angry little looks from the CDA benches if I have too many dialogues or discussions with the left of the Chamber."

[Question] You are actually disassociating yourself from De Vries, instead of De Vries from you.

[Lubbers] "Yes, perhaps that is true to some extent."

[Question] Thus that dualism . . .

[Lubbers] "It's the way you look at it. It is just like trains. If you see something moving, you wonder whether you are moving or the other."

8700

CSO: 3614/44

SWEDEN BECOMING IMPORTANT SUPPLIER FOR NORWEGIAN FORCES

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 31 Jan 87 p 18

[Article by Nils Petter Tanderø: "Swedish in Norwegian Armed Forces"]

[Text] The armed forces invest about five billion kroner in new materiel annually, and of the half of the contracts which go to foreign countries, about 40 percent go to Swedish firms. These are the words of Defense Ministry Department Head Bjarne J. Eggesbø to ARBEIDERBLADET in connection with the opening of Nordic Electronic Systems A/S in Halden. This firm is owned by the Swedish Ericsson concern and Lehmkuhl Electronics (Elektrisk Bureau) and will develop, among other things, advanced radar technology for the armed forces.

Bjarne Eggesbø says that since the government agreement between Norway and Sweden was entered into in 1983 the Swedish share of defense contracts with foreign countries has increased from 20 to 40 percent.

Eggesbø says that when the armed forces enter into major contracts with foreign companies so-called redemption agreements are entered into as a rule-- assignments are to be given to Norwegian firms for approximately the same amount as the value of the defense contracts.

"There is a military equipment trade deficit between Norway and Sweden, and we are working on procuring assignments for Norwegian industry in Sweden. The Kongsberg Arms Plant is one of the concerns which is relevant in this connection."

The armed forces have ordered trucks from Saab-Scandia, Robot 70's from Bofors and caterpillar vehicles from Hagglunds & Soner (ASEA [Swedish General Electric]) to the tune of almost three billion Norwegian kroner. The armed forces' nationwide automatic telephone systems are based on computer-controlled exchanges supplied by the Ericsson concern.

A basis for reducing the military equipment trade deficit between Norway and Sweden was formed with the establishment of Ericsson-owned Nordic Electronic Systems and Saab-Scandia in Halden. As is widely known, Saab-Scandia, together with Ericsson and Volvo Aircraft Engine, is developing the Swedish JAS fighter plane project.

JORGENSEN, ENGELL DEBATE WAYS TO GET SECURITY PLAN CONSENSUS

Jorgensen Cites 'Norwegian Model'

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 17 Feb 87 pp 10-11

[Op Ed Article by Anker Jorgensen, Social Democratic Party chairman: "A Defense Compromise According to the Norwegian Model"; first paragraph is AKTUELT introduction]

[Text] Last week the "Ostergaard Committee--a security policy committee--was in Norway. The visit perhaps opened up possibilities for a new defense compromise.

The time has come to bring Denmark's security policy up to date. To formulate a platform which can win broad support in the Folketing and which still does not give into the massive popular support for the disarmament policy which found expression in the many resolutions skirting the government in the last few years. But is this at all possible?

A group of Danish Folketing politicians visited Norway last week. This is not dramatic in itself. But this trip was something special. For the Danish traveling party was identical with the "Ostergaard Committee"--a security policy committee appointed by the Folketing. The idea for the committee was Svend Auken's, and the purpose to create a place where we could discuss security policy constructively. In order to find the areas where, in spite of everything, we agree.

But progress has been slow in the Ostergaard Committee. Until last week. The visit to Norway showed new possibilities. In part, we can learn from the way the Norwegian Storting tackles security policy disagreements, and in part, the trip revealed unexpected openness from some of my non-socialist traveling companions. Two realities something really full of promise can come out of.

In many ways there are the same disagreements as in Denmark in the Norwegian disarmament debate and security policy discussion. Still there is not the security policy confrontation we have experienced in Denmark. But why? Not because decisive concepts like a nuclear-free zone in the North, for example, have been put on cold Norwegian ice. On the contrary, the Nordic zone forms

part of the parties' working basis. It is called Storting Report No 225 up there.

Of course we are quite familiar with the political situation in Norway. They do not, as we do, have a real disarmament policy majority which is in agreement in a number of decisive areas. But there is some indication that it is on the way. But Norwegian politicians have to a greater extent had to find viable solutions everyone can be a party to.

With the new openness I experienced on the trip and in conversations with members of the Norwegian foreign affairs committee, I think that Danish security policy can rest on a considerably broader majority--without our shaking the cornerstones it builds on. Let me outline briefly what they consist in.

Denmark is a member of NATO, but this does not mean that we must in every respect follow the positions which our big ally the USA wants us to. I think there is very good reason to be critical toward the USA's nuclear weapons strategy for Europe. The USA and certain governments in Europe refuse to cut down on the number of nuclear weapons and they say no to international agreements concerning a ban on first use. They were also unsympathetic as far as a moratorium on deployment of the 572 nuclear missiles was concerned, and stubbornly took a firm stand on their deployment--regardless of explicit demands for negotiations before the new nuclear weapons were put into position. When Reagan took over after Carter, he did not make any real attempt to negotiate. On the contrary, he intensified the situation. This resulted in a buildup in the nuclear area. The nuclear stockpiles have grown so tremendously that today the world has nuclear weapons with an explosive force of over one million times that of the Hiroshima bomb.

Such a strong increase in nuclear stockpiles will not only mean that we will get more, but also more precise, incredibly fast and even invisible weapons, with which it will never be possible to feel safe from a surprise attack. Supposedly, it will also not be possible to ascertain who fired the nuclear missile or even where it came from. As we know, the missiles also contain several warheads.

Any thinking human being could not let this development happen without real attempts to slam on the brakes. No one said it is simple to brake the global race between the superpowers, which has now even spread to the universe. And it can of course be interpreted as though a little country has totally lost its sense of proportion when it begins to be critical of the superpower it is in alliance with.

I also think that there must be a serious backdrop for making a public display of disagreement. But no backdrop can be more serious than that created precisely by the nuclear arms race.

We demonstrated this as far back as 1956. H.C. Hansen said that we did not want nuclear weapons on Danish soil in peace time. This was a decision which our big ally needed some time to get used to accepting. Several parties

reacted strongly against our anti-nuclear policy at that time. Parts of the press were strongly critical.

In the 70's we experienced a brief period of detente between the superpowers. The people of the world became hopeful when 35 countries in the East and West, headed by the superpowers, signed the Helsinki agreements. Of course, Denmark was also a cosigner. The process of detente was developing favorably. But soon the hope changed to fear. Detente had to give way to a new buildup and ice-cold USA-Soviet relations.

Then there we were at the beginning of the 80's and we realized that if there were to be any initiatives for detente, then we had to take them ourselves. We could not just depend on superpower talks--if they took place at all. The social democrats--not just in Denmark--took a great number of initiatives against growth in nuclear weapons. The many proposals concerning nuclear-free zones also became a rallying point. The world is changing, and we for a long time let ourselves be satisfied with the fact that the North was quite actually free of nuclear weapons. The idea of nuclear-free zones was a clear continuation of our freedom from nuclear weapons in peace time.

We proposed that the Nordic countries jointly agree to work for a treaty-bound nuclear-free North. A treaty which would hold that the superpowers, as well as the two military blocs--NATO and the Warsaw Pact--accept such a zone. In this way the Nordic zone will be able to naturally form part of a European process of detente and a real and more comprehensive nuclear relaxation of tensions.

The Palme Commission's report regarding a nuclear-free corridor down through divided Europe was one of the many initiatives inspired by the zone idea. Concrete disarmament proposals which arose under the ever more threatening nuclear cloud. The social democratic government supported the idea of a nuclear-free zone which includes both sides of the dividing line which splits Europe.

All this is our backdrop today, and it is thoughts like these which we encountered in Norway. If the Danish security policy committee has the determination, I also think that we in Denmark can achieve a far higher degree of security policy agreement. On an up-to-date basis, and with a more open relationship to efforts for detente, such as found expression, among other things, in the many resolutions the Folketing security policy majority passed.

As far as Danish defense itself is concerned, it is not wise to be so unsympathetic toward the Social Democratic Party's stand. As we know, it is to the effect that we would like to see a new defense compromise for a new period, but it must stay within the same budget in effect for the current period. That is, we also agree that there has to be wage and price indexing. This is really a great kindness on the part of the opposition to the government parties, because those same parties have generally been so tremendously busy with social cutbacks and also with the elimination of cost-of-living adjustments in a number of social areas. This does not provide the very best psychological backdrop for defense negotiations, but it is of course

an expression of the fact that we too take seriously the whole question of our defense.

Besides, it must be possible to cut, reorganize and also take efficiency measures in the defense system, and the gain which can be achieved with this the armed forces ought to have for improvements in areas where it is believed there are deficiencies today.

The disagreement which can exist in a number of points concerning Denmark's security policy is really a natural thing in a democratic society. Opinions can and will clash but when the talking is done there must also be an interest in creating the greatest possible agreement.

I have noticed somewhat greater mobility among the government parties. Also although the Social Democratic Party has had to be at the receiving end of allegations that we are almost the Soviet Union's errand boy. This kind of thing is tolerable, first, when one knows that our policy without doubt has broad support among the Danish people, and, second, when it is known that there is a comparable shift in the world outside Denmark. Not only in Europe, but also in the USA, which clearly sees the danger in blindly pursuing and eye-for-an-eye and a tooth-for-a-tooth policy.

I came home from a profitable visit to Norway. And I think that the Ostergaard Committee can write a report which proves that there is a shift among Danish politicians. That there is openness toward other possibilities than those which were canonized at one time. If I am right, I anticipate positive work in the security policy committee. With a shift to the benefit of peace and an active detente policy.

Engell Denies 'Rationalization' Effective

Copenhagen AKTUEL in Danish 26 Feb 87 pp 10-11

[Op Ed Article by Defense Minister Hans Engell: "Military Credibility"]

[Text] Will it be possible to create greater unity regarding Danish foreign and security policy from now on? The chairman of the Social Democratic Party, Ex-Prime-Minister Anker Jorgensen, looked at this interesting question the other day in a feature article in AKTUEL. The point of departure was the trip the Folketing's special Ostergaard Committee just made in Norway. Anker Jorgensen's answer was not unequivocal, but it is however satisfying that the Social Democratic Party leader regards the trip as a positive basis for further reflections, and that the discussions with Norwegian experts have apparently given the discussion here at home a new dimension. However, Anker Jorgensen's own views do not reflect greater mobility, and this of course can become a problem. On the other hand, some principal lines are drawn which call for a commentary.

It is correct when Anker Jorgensen emphasizes the many points of similarity which can be found between the Norwegian and Danish security policy debate. Norway and Denmark are very much in line in many important questions, and our policies, including as far as questions concerning stationing and nuclear

weapons are concerned, are quite parallel. Our two countries have also to a great extent taken the same stand in relation to a number of the important security policy questions which have characterized the debate over the last few years. Still Anker Jorgensen passes by the fact that there also are--and have been--considerable differences. It is accordingly characteristic that neither the former non-socialist nor the present social democratic government in Norway have wanted to demonstrate within the NATO alliance special stands expressed as footnotes to the alliance's communiques. This happened only once--in connection with the Strategic Defense Initiative--but the reservation was able to be removed at the subsequent meeting. It is not my impression that Norwegian footnotes are to be expected in the future. On the other hand, on Norway's part the stage has apparently been set for a line whereby an attempt is made, through an active and purposeful policy within the alliance, to influence the alliance's development and stands on concrete questions, but with the clear resolution in advance that there can be no question of reservations. For me there is no doubt that this has given the Norwegians greater influence and ability to influence, just as on Norway's part it is possible to have a reasonable expectation that considerable regard will be paid to Norwegian standpoints. Such a practice ought to provide food for thought here at home too. The Danish footnote policy of the last few years can hardly be said plainly to have created greater sympathy for Danish stands. Here the systematic use of resolutions in the Folketing as a tool for controlling security policy and our solitary footnotes to the communiques have stood out as the visible expression of Danish isolation. Thus, I quite agree with the reflections Norway's Defense Minister Johan Jorgen Holst recently presented to the Oslo Military Society, where he asserted that an alliance must be based on unity and solidarity. Unilateral sticking to one's own viewpoints weakens the alliance. All member countries therefore have an obvious obligation to, but also an obvious interest in contributing to the formation of unity-building solutions. In unity there is strength. But unity presumes respect for the views of the individual member countries and the determination to work actively to create united stands.

It is important to stress the difference there seems to be in Norway's and Denmark's policies as far as our own contributions to defense are concerned, too. Norway uses about 50 percent more on its defense per inhabitant than we do here at home. There is broad political agreement in Norway concerning the implementation of essential improvements and new procurements for Norwegian defense in future years, too. The Norwegian social democratic party is talking about neither freezing nor cutting the defense budget. An equivalent stand among Danish social democrats is hard to find. Thus, when Anker Jorgensen thinks that the Danish defense system will be able to maintain its effectiveness within the current budget, it must be based on a very superficial assessment of the defense system's situation. In order to avoid any doubt, I would like to make it clear that an unchanged defense budget in the years to come will automatically result in quite considerable reductions in the current level of defense. In other words, we cannot at the same time keep Danish defense--with the present force level and materiel plans--at just the modest level we have today unless the budget is increased moderately in coming years.

Index linkage--which just provides coverage for increases which have taken place in wages, for example, and for fluctuation in the value of the krone--thus provides no solution at all to defense's problems. Our wage and price indexing system is good--better than many other countries'--but it cannot be used as an excuse for the general defense level's being at the bottom of all NATO countries'. In spite of Denmark's high national product, we are one of the countries which contributes least to our own defense. The 3- to 5-percent annual increase in expenditures which is created by technological developments alone is also not being taken into account in the defense budget.

It is an unrealistic claim when Anker Jorgensen talks about being able to cut, render more efficient and reorganize and thus gain a more effective defense system for the same money. It is also characteristic that not the slightest documentation is given for this. Defense's situation long ago passed the level where the problems can be solved within an unchanged budget. If Anker Jorgensen is in doubt about this, I would be very happy to invite him to a tour of armed forces units. But Anker Jorgensen's viewpoint of course makes it necessary that the coming defense negotiations be thorough and detailed, so that decisions are not made on the basis of deficient knowledge of the actual conditions.

We can also not ignore the importance of our own defense effort alliancewise. If Danish defense is weakened further in coming years, this cannot avoid having a strong negative effect on Denmark's position in the alliance. For a weaker Danish defense will mean that other countries will have to solve the problems we cannot manage ourselves. And here we are talking about countries whose standard of living is often poorer than Denmark's, and which as it is are bearing a comparatively greater burden than we are. And how do you think weakening of Danish defense will be regarded in the countries which, should the occasion arise, will be requested to send reinforcements in considerable numbers to Denmark? How will this influence English reflections concerning the future of the 13,000-man UKMF reinforcement force? The answers to this seem to be quite obvious. If stronger doubt about Danish defense's staying power and ability to receive allied reinforcements spreads among our allies, it can have decisive consequences which will not be to our advantage. And I will not at all mention the universal principle of solidarity, which an alliance must be based on.

Anker Jorgensen talks a lot about peace, but apparently will not spend more to ensure it. In my opinion this harmonizes poorly with the views being adopted in relation to the strategic role of nuclear weapons, for example. We cannot disagree concerning the correctness and appropriateness of working for less dependence on nuclear weapons. But it is a general attitude--also among a number of social democratic parties in West Europe--that greater lack of dependence on nuclear weapons can require conventional credibility. There is no order to the conventional balance today. Therefore the continued weakening of Danish defense will really result in a development which is directly contrary to the Social Democratic Party's declared policy. For we will become even more dependent on nuclear weapons. There is a clear connection here which cannot just be glossed over. POLITIKEN's editor-in-chief, Herbert Pundik, was totally right when in September 1983--in the middle of the missile debate here at home--he wrote the following: "We do not want to have the

American missiles. We do not want to build our own nuclear defense. And we do not want to maintain a credible deterrent defense. We just want to have peace. But peace and independence do not exist in our violent world without a credible defense."

Harmful As Campaign Issue

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 16 Mar 87 p 14

[Commentary by 'Monitor': "Defense Compromise Before Election Campaign"]

[Text] It is best for the Social Democratic Party to have a defense compromise before the election in order to be able to document their responsibility and credibility, and it is best for the government to be able to present an outcome which can make the voters forget the many security policy humiliations.

The debate concerning Danish security and defense policy has this spring reached a phase where decisions must be made. They must be, if the tense security policy debate of recent years is to find a more objective level so the painful resolution war and the unpleasant footnotes can be avoided; and they must be if a defense compromise to take effect as of 1988 is to be entered into.

The Folketing is also working on the issues. The Ostergaard Committee--which was to have been an interim and quickly working one--has been sitting for a couple of years now without any success yet in squeezing out agreement. And the special 11-man defense committee has been circling around the realities for some time. An interim stocktaking can be performed before the elections are over. Have their discussions anything to do with one another? How great possibilities do they have of reaching agreement? And will they reach it before the election?

It would be thought on the face of it that security policy and defense policy were two sides of the same issue--but ever since the last century there has been a certain tradition of differentiating between things here at home. This is also happening in the debates in the Folketing. Security policy has become a question of Danish demonstrations in NATO and the UN, of declared nuclear-free zones, and of Danish stands on the Great Powers' arms reduction talks and withdrawal from SDI projects, whereas defense policy has become a question of appropriations and technical and tactical matters. Security policy has become the completely abstract and often non-committal signal to associates concerning attitudes and opinions. Defense policy is the concrete signal to allies and potential opponents.

However, the two areas have in common the fact that neither of them is particularly easily understood by outsiders--and it is not just the public in general, but also many politicians themselves who have difficulty in learning their way around the concepts and lines of thought. Strictly speaking, this means that the voters and Folketing colleagues have to accept the negotiators' words at face value. If they say that they agree and a given question has

been removed from the agenda, then the problem has actually been solved--not in reality, of course, but as a domestic policy problem.

The vigorous public debate of recent years concerning foreign policy has raised the level of attention, and the information level has also improved with the Folketing committees' travel and meeting activity. The government and committee chairmen have made a good effort here, which has also made the more skeptical politicians expose themselves to purposeful information. Which recent experiences have been able to influence negotiation stands?

First, one has become more unsure of the Americans. The Reykjavik meeting for a chilling moment let the question be open of America's negotiating away the nuclear umbrella over Europe. And the Europeans at the same time have to resign themselves to the fact that the Reagan administration's hawks are chewing them out for doing too little about defense, while some of Congress's doves are threatening to cut the number of stationed American troops. This makes it a little difficult to choose fighting companions in the American debate.

Secondly, it has been learned that the big West European countries and Canada are in part reflecting on the most appropriate use of their military resources--and this can affect the reinforcements for Norway and Denmark--and in part are reflecting on whether they themselves would be best served by a closer alliance--in the West Union, for example; and this can isolate Denmark from influence. After the German election and with the current trends in most West European countries, there is now not much to indicate greater support for the Danish Social Democratic course.

Thirdly, it has become clear that Norway and Sweden have become more watchful and threat-conscious and are tending toward strengthening their already relatively stronger defense systems. This has thrown the Danish defense system into relief.

And fourthly, developments have shown that Denmark has not gotten positive returns from the footnote policy and empty declarations after the many security policy resolutions. NATO has not followed the Danish course, and what is worse is the fact that it appears in addition that NATO has for the present had success with a more strength-accented policy. Armament programs and SDI--Reagan's version of the nonaggressive defense--have shown themselves to be the strongest cards in the superpowers' arms reduction talks. Now it is just a question of playing them correctly.

All in all, developments in the last half-year have gone against Danish Social Democratic viewpoints. Therefore it is not so odd that they are now tying their hopes to a new Russian policy. But they have actually learned something.

A development has also taken place here at home. The disarmament movements have had difficulty in keeping the steam up in the long run, and the disarmament issue has shown itself to be less politically fruitful than it first appeared. It is now repelling just as many as it is attracting outside the left wing proper.

A slide toward a stronger willingness to compromise--which can also be noticed in Lasse Budtz's statements--has occurred in the Social Democratic Party. Now when the defense negotiations are pending it has been discovered that it seems a little difficult to lead defense policy to one side and security policy to another. The latent threat of not entering into a compromise but of bringing the alternative majority into the annual negotiations instead has presumably been hinted at. But this is equivalent to threatening by shooting oneself in the foot--once a year at that--because the SF [Socialist People's Party] will then take over the initiative.

Svend Auken and Karl Hjortnaes have gained greater influence, and it would be a feather in the hat for both of them if they can create an acceptable defense compromise and make security policy more credible--after the many years of wandering in the desert with the SF'ers. A few years ago few would have thought that the government would pin its faith on them, but they have shown greater openness and objectivity than Knud Daa, for example, who has become Mads Madsen [Matt Contrary] on the gangway, bound to his personal pet ideas in technical and tactical areas. Anker Jorgensen's desire for a zero solution with price controls is also a conciliatory step, a new signal to the party, public opinion and negotiation partners. The security policy runamuckers have begun to jog somewhat alone out on the wing.

While the SF'ers have become isolated--a disappointment after several years of an easy game in the resolution policy--the Radical Liberals have been too late in starting to adapt. They will hardly get to take part in the defense compromise negotiations, but they can surely henceforth tacitly accept the outcome in return for adequate compensation.

With this constellation the government has a better basis than for a long time, but there are still big problems. It has not become easier to support a good real growth in the defense budget at a time when thrift is being urged and when spending demands are pouring in from all directions. However, here it must be remembered that simple economic logic does not apply in politics. Political logic says rather that if one party's pet sector is to have more, then another's darling must too. Fortunately the government has at its disposal well documented expertise in solving financial problems. If the determination is good, big increases can easily be masked as zero solutions--especially if a compromise stretches over several years.

The question now is what influence it will have that we are in an election year--without knowing when the election will come, but with the probability that it will not be an election on foreign policy.

It is best for the Social Democrats to have a defense compromise before the election in order to be able to document their responsibility and credibility. And if they win the election and are to rely on the SF, an entered-into compromise can be used as one of the sticks the SF'ers are to be beaten with. If on the other hand the government survives and is strengthened, the Social Democrats would be weaker with deferred negotiations--also because the Radical Liberals' role can change.

It is best for the government to be able to present an outcome which can make the voters forget the many security policy humiliations. If it wins the election, it can be let off from worrying about the subject for a time; if it loses, it can console itself with having safeguarded defense for several years ahead.

If neither of the sides wants to wage an election campaign on the issue, but would rather be able to refer to broad agreement and stability, it ought to be possible to reach a defense compromise which both sides can call a victory. Although the defense minister has pretended to be objective and powerful, the government will without doubt be willing to a compromise on a slightly lower level. And if the words "nonaggressive defense" are the price for index linkage which takes into account a special defense policy cost-of-living index, it should certainly be paid. The rate of increase can then be made fuzzy in the text of the compromise. The concrete defense strategy and materiel procurements--which no voter understands anyhow--ought to be able to find a mostly objective solution.

There is thus much to indicate that both the government and Social Democratic Party have an interest in concluding a defense compromise before the election campaign, and that the distance now is not greater than that it should be possible. If this is the situation, it would certainly be wise if the sides hurried a little. But when all is said and done, it is of course difficult to predict whether there will be a compromise. Skeptics will say that since it depends on Anker Jorgensen it is unforeseeable. But--to quote a well known Social Democratic sage--we are allowed to hope.

8831

CSO: 3613/51

VULNERABILITY OF STRATEGIC BALTIC APPROACHES REVIEWED

Bonn RHEINISCHER MERKUR/CHRIST UND WELT in German 9 Jan 87 p 5

[Article by Franz Wauschkuhn: "The Vulnerable Heel in the North of Europe"]

[Text] "Message to CINCNORTH, notice to WESTERN APPROACHES Allied Command:

1. Soviet Forces are pushing forward against Aarhus with heavy air force support.
2. Great and Little Belt only half mined.
3. All naval units which are still operational were ordered into the North Sea. Submarines are patrolling the Kattegat. Surface vessels are trying to contain enemy surface vessels and are fueling at Stavanger from now on.
4. The Danish government is on the way to Great Britain by air.
5. ComBALTAP with its staffs will soon leave Karup for Kolsaas by air.

It took the Warsaw Pact armed forces only 72 hours after their attack to breach a gap in the NATO defense barrier between North Cape and Gibraltar. Advance units of the 2nd Guards Armored Army succeeded in crossing the Kiel Canal after just six hours. They rattled across the German-Danish border on the evening of this first day. Then the main Danish islands of Sjaelland and Fyn fell into the hands of the Red Army's amphibious landing troops almost without a fight. The only serious resistance still offered was that of the Bundeswehr's 6th Armored Infantry Division which, together with cadres of the Danish Jyske Division, was encircled in a pocket in northern Jutland and hoping for reinforcements that never came.

Fog is descending on this winter afternoon as we drive from Herning to Karup. The tenacious dusk makes the rolling meadow and heath landscape appear even drearier and more deserted. Sir John Hackett, the former commander of the British Rhine Army, must have had this landscape in mind when he wrote down the desperate war scenario in his future shocker, "The Third World War."

A pair of F-16 fighter bombers start to land with a roar on the peacefully illuminated runway. A closed barrier; a sentry with a submachine gun steps

out of the dark. "A guest for the BALTAP commander," my driver says. The sentry gives a salute and raises the barrier. It is a woman. She has pinned up her thick blond hair behind her cap. "There are a lot of women here," the PFC says as we again drive on. "The Danish fellow soldiers especially like to serve in the Fridericia Brigade. Most of the women are there."

On my first visit to Karup in 1976 we had taken off from Copenhagen in a small Do-28. A Soviet Kildin-Class destroyer was slowly sailing from the north toward the Sound [Oeresund]. "One of our constant observers on patrol," said the pilot at the time. Soviet naval monitoring of the accesses to the Baltic Sea has been steadily intensified since then. The Warsaw Pact's warships are present 365 days a year between Ruegen and Trelleborg, on the Fehmarn Belt, even off Kiel Bay, up to the entrance of the Skagerrak.

"Karup, that's like being posted to Transsylvania in the Kaiser's army," many Bundeswehr officers complain. But hidden behind that is not only the fear of suddenly having to spend one's days in the Danish provincial area far from the urbanity of the Federal Republic, but also the gloomy feeling of fighting a losing battle anyway in the event things should get serious.

Even for the two million people in the greater Copenhagen area, Karup is only some one-horse town in boorish Jutland. Only a few are aware that all command nerves for defending its 400 islands, Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg come out of there. The majority have forgotten that strategically they are living like the cork on the bottle 41 years after the liberation of the little kingdom by the British. One can go neither in nor out of the Baltic Sea without possessing Denmark. Lord Nelson recognized that, just as Hitler or Soviet Admiral Gorshkov did.

"Polar Sea Division" is what in the Bundeswehr they jokingly call the "Sixth" which is stationed in Schleswig-Holstein--an indication of Central Europe-centered thinking. The most northerly Bundesland [i.e. Schleswig-Holstein] and the accesses to the Baltic Sea are considered peripheral from a defense-policy point of view and thus of less importance. The continental-thinking Germans and carefree Copenhageners overlook the fact that the military verdict on Western Europe's freedom or lack of freedom would probably be made at sea, between Greenland and Norway. Western Europe can be conquered only if the Soviet navy and air force succeed in permanently cutting the shipping routes across the North Atlantic. To do that, however, the Soviet Baltic Fleet needs free access to the North Sea. If the Danish cork to the Baltic Sea is pulled first, the naval vessels from Murmansk and the Baltic Sea can sandwich in Norway. Moscow would have its free ticket to Great Britain and the North Atlantic.

The late notorious Air Marshal Hermann Goering had quite precise ideas about Denmark's hinge function back as early as the mid-1930's. Right after the 1940 occupation he had Europe's largest airfield leveled off in Karup with 6,000 workers and 1,400 trucks, and about 400 planes were stationed there at times. Karup's 40 kilometers of runway remained a German springboard to Norway and launching pad against England up into March of 1945. But the energetic entrepreneurs and engineers of the Todt organization had overlooked one decisive factor: Karup lies in one of northern Europe's worst fog pockets.

Alexander Haig avoided this inhospitable air base as much as possible during his period of office as NATO supreme commander. But when it became absolutely necessary to show the flag here too, he announced with a steely smile of a McArthur that everything was taking a turn for the better in the "HQ Baltic Approaches" (BALTAP). "Don't be afraid of the Warsaw Pact's tenfold superior power," Haig cheered up the officers, "more ammunition and heavy artillery is being stockpiled in Jutland. The deployment of reinforcement troops is being further systematized."

But what has not been promised the BALTAP Command since it was founded on 9 January 1962? More ships, more aircraft, more ground forces. But there has certainly been less and less on the Danish side: social welfare expenses grew and there was economizing in defense. Mogens Glistrup, the boasting Poujadist from the island of Bornholm, even had the idea of installing an answering machine in the defense ministry. Its text: "We surrender." Long-time social democratic prime minister Anker Joergensen has not permitted it to go that far, although he also toyed with this idea over beer.

No, the allied staff officers do not like to recall that. Nor should any signs of rifts between the nations arise. "Do we Germans not often show toward our Danish comrades the same big-power attitude which so displeases us about the Americans?," a naval captain asks over lunch. "The Danish officers are absolute professionals," is the unanimous opinion. High praise is sung about the Danish Home Guard. Would 80,000 men and women perhaps put on fatigues, practice with light weapons or dig out positions on weekends in the Federal Republic? The Home Guard's enthusiasm can only be compared with the manifest spirit of defense of the Swiss. German, English and American colleagues at Karup chalk up as a peculiar national trait the fact that Danish professional soldiers adhere strictly to a 40-hour week even on maneuvers.

Lieutenant General Guenter Raulf, BALTAP deputy commander, does not consider it possible that they could be overrun by a Soviet blitz action. Rather, he is concerned about the low stocks of ammunition, and more concerned whether they can intercept air attacks from medium altitudes. The six Hawk missile batteries should be urgently replaced by the American Patriot system, especially since the threat is known. The first aim of the Soviet air fleets would probably be to force open an air corridor over the Baltic approaches in order to neutralize the allied air bases in Great Britain. The officers at Karup believe that Sweden is a terrain fraught with difficulties for the Soviets, for the Swedish air force is said to be of enviable quality.

Ten armored infantry divisions, several airborne divisions in the Baltic, the largest massing of landing ships and amphibious vessels in times of peace, plus 77 subs, 210 surface combat ships (from the missile cruiser to the corvette) and 150 minesweepers on the Soviet side, as well as strong forces of Poland and the GDR People's Army, do not make it easy for the allies at Karup to give credence to Moscow's chiming of the Baltic as a "sea of peace." Was not the Warsaw Pact's "Comradeship-in-Arms" landing maneuver, staged in the summer of 1980 between Ruegen and Hela, a cheap imitation of the 1944 "D Day" in Normandy?

The initial setting on NATO's "BOLD GUARD" maneuver in September of 1986 states: "it is assumed that after a long period of growing tension and two days of war, the outside reinforcements in COMLANDJUT's operational area have arrived and either have finished the preparation of their deployment area or are establishing operational readiness." That exactly describes the premise of any defense effort that could have a prospect of success. But if this tension and early warning period is omitted, German and Danes can only keep a stiff upper lip.

Seen strategically, the defense of the Baltic approaches raises almost unsolvable problems--roughly comparable to the set of problems which the general staff officers of the Weimar Reichswehr had to overcome in the defense planning for East Prussia. So delaying defense [action] is also apparently the supreme motto in the BALTAP area. It would depend on the German 6th Armored Infantry Division getting through the first days alone in case of an enemy blitz attack--amphibious landings on the islands and on the Schleswig-Holstein coast, airborne landings in the interior and armored thrusts across the East-West border north of Hamburg. Only then does the cadre-strength Danish Jutland Division, with a peacetime standby size of 25 percent, have a chance to be replenished. That is to say: the Karup commander can initially rely only on the "Sixth" (with 24,000 men, the strongest division in the Bundeswehr) and on Denmark's and the Bundeswehr's air force and naval squadrons in case of a surprise attack.

But what if the Soviets--and this is the most probable form an attack would take--want to extort the Copenhagen government by occupying Bornholm, by harassing Danish ships or with ominous military demonstrations? Understandably, nobody in Karup would like to give an answer to that. The striking power at sea and from the air is of considerable importance in this scenario. The German naval air units have Tornado and Starfighter fighter bombers, the Danes F-16 and F-35 (Draken) squadrons. The Bundesmarine's type 143 missile patrol boats are among the most modern in the world. The German submarines, which are hard to detect even with the newest sonar gear, should tie up significant enemy forces.

The picture would of course be incomplete without the recognition of "COMANDJUT," which, subordinate to the BALTAP commander, is responsible for land defense between the Elbe and north point of Jutland. Lieutenant General Henning von Ondarza (headquarters Rendsburg) again and again points out the paramount importance of forward defense in the Schleswig-Holstein area. Denmark's security also depends in the end on the strengthening of this defense, which is already in the stage of developing into a crisis. In this context, von Ondarza calls the "multinational presence of forward defense" a question of "great political dimension." He includes in this armed forces from England, Denmark, the USA and the Federal Republic, but also--surprisingly--from Canada.

It is Friday afternoon when I leave Karup and BALTAP headquarters. A winter storm is in the air. Commanding general Niels-Aage Rye Andersen is standing over sherry in the officers' mess, surrounded by British and German officers.

Seen historically, this is a coalition such as only the Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugen had gathered around them on their staffs. At that time it also involved the balance of power in Europe; or, that is to say, stemming the expansionism of a big power by the multitude of small ones. The road to the main gate of the airfield winds across hill and valley. The same female soldier is standing at the barrier.

We will come back to the COMLANDJUT questions in a later talk with General von Ondarza.

13084

CSO: 3620/164

CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER SEES GAINS IN STAFFING, STRUCTURE

Bonn BUNDESWEHR AKTUELL in German 18 Feb 87 p 3

[Article by Lt Gen Claus Voss (MC), datelined Hamm: "'Personnel Situation Will Improve.' Lecture by medical corps Lieutenant General Dr Claus Voss on Development and Goals of the Medical Service"; first paragraph is BUNDESWEHR AKTUELL introduction.]

[Text] Not only the FDP has its Epiphany meeting; the senior base officer of Hamm, who at the same time is the senior medical officer of the Bundeswehr hospital there, extends invitations to the Sachsenhalle in the Heesen quarter of the city year after year on this date. Medical corps Colonel Dr Dietmar Leist was even able to get the chief of staff of the Bundeswehr's medical and health service for this year's lecture. Medical corps Lieutenant General Dr Claus Voss dealt with the topic "The Bundeswehr's Medical Service--Expectations and Objectives for the 1990's," which we give a brief account of here.

The medical service was the target of manifold criticism in recent months: from simple complaints, through petitions to the chief of staff of the medical and health services, to the chief of staff of the Bundeswehr, the federal minister of defense, to individual representatives, up to the German Bundestag's representative for military affairs, critical rebukes of the German Bundeswehr Association, and even as far as a big parliamentary inquiry. Even if the number of complaints made is insignificantly slight in view of a figure of roughly 3.5 million investigations and treatments per year by the medical service and even if the overwhelming majority of petitions were not able to stand up to specific examination, a certain discontent of individuals with our performance is still seen from this. This is based less on deficiencies in the infrastructure or organization, but on the still unfavorable personnel situation. Around 60 percent of the medical unit duty posts are still occupied by conscript medical officers, which, in spite of the recognized personal commitment of these colleagues, leads to deficiencies in the care of longer-serving volunteer and professional soldiers in particular, because of a lack of medical experience and a high turnover rate. Yet, the personnel situation will continue to improve; and this gives me well-founded cause for an optimistic look forward. For instance, because of the need for an increase in active medical officers, 465 additional slots were required from 1984 to 1986, and these were continually occupied.

Also, 170 additional new slots were introduced for medical officers in the 1987 budget.

The shortage is being further reduced by gaining about 160 medical officer candidates who are appointed as medical officers every year, so that we can completely do without conscript physicians by the mid-1990's.

What will be important for the future unit medical officer will be to know about the peculiarities of everyday military life, to be able to make an accurate risk assessment and for each soldier to evaluate whether he will be up to the requirements of his duty post.

The training of the unit medical officers must take this into consideration, which is very useful to the military careers of the medical officer candidates.

With the increase in longer-serving medical officers, possibilities now also exist to further improve their training; thus, for example, consideration is being given to putting a part of the advanced training before employment as a unit medical officer, as is already the case for certain applications today. By so doing, more clinically experienced medical officers will be available to the soldiers as physicians having their confidence.

Along with the improvement in the personnel situation of medical officers, there must at the same time also be an organizational improvement by a rise in the army's medical centers. Tangible successes were almost reached here after tough discussions just last month. Then it will also be possible, in accordance with the work safety law, to guarantee labor-medical and physician's care for all members of the Bundeswehr through an area-covering network of unit physicians. For this purpose, 72 operational medical physicians' groups are being set up, affiliated with medical centers; and 20 of these will be able to start work already some time soon.

Data processing is certainly the area from which the look into the future can be most intensively directed. Being just set up at hospitals and institutes here are specialized information systems which mean an optimization of labor through systematization and control of the data flows and which facilitate immediate access to information that is otherwise hard to access. According to my ideas, possible applications up to the level of unit medical officers must also develop from these pilot projects in the future.

13084

CSO: 3620/166

BORDER, LAND POLICE FORCES SAID INADEQUATE FOR DEFENSE NEEDS

Bonn ZIVILVERTEIDIGUNG in German, No 4, 1986 pp 44-49

[Article by Hans-Juergen Schmidt: "Police Tasks Within the Scope of Total Defense and Civil-Military Cooperation"; First paragraph is ZIVILVERTEIDIGUNG introduction.]

[Text] The following article is intended as an attempt to give examples of the fundamental significance of the tasks of the Federal Republic's police within the scope of total defense.

It is meant to stimulate discussion and point out the danger that the BGS [Federal Border Guard], the Federal Republic's multifunctional police, is still operational in the short or long run only on a limited basis, because of constant cutbacks and restructuring of its personnel and materiel base, therefore threatening a collapse of a considerable component of civil defense, and thus also total defense. It is meant to draw attention to the possibility of a long-term concept for the necessary expansion and buildup of this federal police instrument within the framework of civil defense.

A broad spectrum of legislative measures is required and various powers of the executive are necessary in order to fulfill the regular circle of government tasks of the defensible, free democratic state system, and thereby able to guarantee the safety of society, peace under the law, internal security and external security; i.e. total defense (see 2.1).

These pillars of a state under the rule of law are:

—social and service administration, the police forces of the Federal Republic and laender, including [the Federal Office] for the Protection of the Constitution, as the element of civil defense and total defense for the internal protection of the state;

—the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany as the military element of total defense for the external protection of the state.

The constitutionally based combination of these three elements forms a TRIAD; i.e. social, internal and external security supplement each other, but cannot be exchanged for or replaced by each other.

Should one of these elements be weakened or collapse, e.g. through deficient budgetary resources, paralysis because of misplanning, subversion, sabotage etc., then the entire structure of the legal and social state is jeopardized; it is threatened with downfall or dictatorship through social tensions, internal unrest, external risk-free influence or even seizure by a possible opponent.

1.1 In 1984/85 the Federal Ministry for Youth, Family and Health (BMJFG) ascertained, inter alia, the following in a report on population development in the Federal Republic of Germany:

"A reduction of the police density in the Federal Republic by the year 2000 is not desirable; what is desirable instead is a strengthening of the currently available police capability, since, otherwise, a considerable rise in the crime rate, as well as a feeling of insecurity on the part of citizens, can be expected, and--connected with that--the stability of internal security threatened." (Bundestag Printed Material 10/863 "Population Report").

In the "1985 White Paper on the Situation and Development of the Bundeswehr," the federal government ascertains that "civil defense is an indispensable component of total defense. The public must be made yet more strongly aware of its importance. The federal government bears the responsibility for total defense.

The goals of the separate spheres of civil and military defense are determined by the political leadership, their interaction is ensured by careful coordination in civil-military cooperation."

However, the above-noted statements do not hold true when observing the development of the Federal Republic's police in the past years and the trends possibly influencing the composition of this unique police force troop capability that is available to the federal government by virtue of original area of responsibility. Rather, the opposite is the case.

This important element of the police security community has experienced considerable turmoil through continual reorganization and disbandments, restructuring and reduction of available operational and training capabilities since the mid-1970's. This cutback of forces results not only in a considerable source of numerous difficulties and uncertainties in the area of the immediate security situation inside the BGS as well as the general internal situation. In the opinion of many experts, here also lies the cause for just hesitant and slow-moving civilian-military cooperation, as well as the barely noted tasks of the Federal Republic's police as a solid component of civil and total defense.

Not only is the efficiency of the federal police and civil defense limited by these frictional losses; chances of a long-term concept for the buildup and expansion of these multifunctional police are also wasted.

1.2 Two events of the past year and a half will not only enter the history of the Federal Border Guard, but also influence the further development of the

security policy discussion in the Federal Republic of Germany: the "1984 Flinker Igel" [lit: "nimble hedgehog"] army exercise and the "Sichere Wacht" ["Certain Sentinel"] large-unit exercise of the Seventh U.S. [Army] Corps in January of this year.

Total Defense Exercises

A total defense exercise in which the interlinking of military and civil national defense was able to be acted out realistically took place in the autumn of 1984 for the first time in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the Bundeswehr, the police of the Federal Republic and of the Free State of Bavaria. The exercise, which was directed by the commanding general of the Second German Corps, Lieutenant General Lange, took place with the full forces of the units involved. The preparatory phase for this "Flinker Igel" army exercise lasted about two years.

A second total defense exercise with full forces, the "Certain Sentinel" large-unit exercise, took place in January of 1985 in the course of the annually recurring REFORGER (Return of Forces to Germany) NATO maneuver.

It was under the overall control of the Seventh U.S. Corps.

While the field army forces subordinate to NATO--i.e. the large unit of the Second German Corps, a Canadian and American brigade--practiced interaction with parts of the territorial army not subordinate to NATO--WBK [Military District Command] VI, the BGS, the police and the civil defense of the Free State of Bavaria--in a case of tension and defense in "Flinker Igel," the components of the U.S. armed forces in southern Germany subordinate to NATO--i.e. the large unit of the Seventh U.S. Corps--and the Wisconsin National Guard which was flown in from the United States tested this interaction with the territorial army, i.e. WBK VI and the deployed police forces from the Federal Republic and laender--during "Certain Sentinel." More than a one-year preparatory phase was also required in this case; and this phase was especially intensive because of the particular conditions in the U.S. armed forces and the language differences.

GSK [Border Group Command] South participated in both large-unit exercises as a component of "civil defense" of the Federal Republic of Germany with two Border Guard Battalions, the Bavarian State Ministry of the Interior with two hundred-man groups ["Hundertschaften"] of the BePo [Alert Police], the Bavarian Border Police and Land Police as well as civil defense forces. However, the forces of the BePo and Land Police (Central Franconian police headquarters) unfortunately dropped out early during the "Certain Sentinel" exercise because of the Wackersdorf operational workload, so that the BGS also shortened its exercise share in the last phase.

Within the framework of BGS [Federal Border Guard Law] legal order Art. 2 "Border Protection," BGS Art. 3 "Tasks in Case of Emergency and Defense," as well as BGS Art. 9 "Supporting the Police of a Land in a Case of Particular Significance" (see Chapter 3.3), the deployed forces of Border Group Command South had the following exercise goals:

1. Testing and checking the currently valid concept of "police border protection" by units and of "area protection."
2. Checking organizational supply and development of possible resupplying.
3. Updating and training in cooperation with the large units of the Second German Corps, the Seventh U.S. Corps and the territorial army (WBK VI), which are responsible in case of tension and defense, during "police border protection," "release from police border protection" and the "march into a rear area."
4. Training in civilian-military cooperation among GSK—WBK VI—State Ministry of the Interior, Middle Franconian Police Headquarters, border, land and alert police forces, as well as civil defense within the framework of "area and installation protection" by a border guard battalion made available to the Land of Bavaria.

Both exercises ended for the units of GSK South with great praise from the commanding generals and the numerous military and civilian observers of this event.

Under the most varied terrain, weather and support conditions, the deployed officials of this border guard command demonstrated through discipline and eagerness for action their positive motivation up to the limits of physical capacity.

But the weak points were also clearly shown, the susceptibility and vulnerability of a border guard battalion deployed over a longer period (here only a week), especially in the sphere of personnel replacement and materiel support due to the lack of their own logistical support channel.

Maintaining Internal Security Guaranteed

Both exercises, which came close to the reality of a crisis case, demonstrated the necessity and importance for safeguarding the existence and survivability of the units of the Federal Republic's police in such an occurrence. Only when both are guaranteed can the legislator, government and citizen assume that the Federal Republic's police can also fulfill their lawful mission to have their forces operationally ready for maintaining internal security in case of crisis, tension or defense. Both exercises showed in a model way the basic features of civilian-military cooperation as a reflection of functional total defense.

But both exercises offered leadership and observers the opportunity to think about a politically long-term concept for strengthening the "police security community" within the scope of the "civil defense mission" of the police forces of the Federal Republic and laender:

1. About a strengthening of the police border guard units and reduction of the far overextended border sectors in order not to have to already employ the armed forces below the threshold of an attack in the border area, also because of the danger of escalating a foreign policy crisis by that.

2. About the gradual personnel and materiel buildup and expansion behind the border guard units, which are currently stationed in the area near the border, in the "2nd line" set up in the interior in the form of "rear units of area and installation protection." (see Chapter 3.2)

This "vision of police regional planning" furthermore opened up the following possibilities to the federal government, corresponding to the "Program for Internal Security":

1. To enlarge the inventory and staff of its police in the longer run, in order thereby to have needed reserves and its own logistics available also in case of crisis.

2. To carry out the integration of the individual service tasks of the GSE (Border Guard Individual Service ["Grenzschutzeinzeldienst"]) on eastern and western borders into the border protection and installation protection units by building up areas K (criminal police investigations/border) and S (offenses against state protection [sic]/border) with the currently available personnel of the GSE.

3. To considerably enhance the police security community, police density and thereby the standard of internal security and civil defense by such a buildup of the Federal Republic's police in cooperation with the police forces of the laender.

2. Definition of total defense, civil defense and internal security:

2.1 Total defense is the sum of all the Federal Republic of Germany's political, military and civilian measures necessary for defense in the national sphere and in the NATO Alliance and therefore a combination of defense efforts on a national and alliance level.

2.2 The Federal Republic of Germany's civil defense comprises the preparation and implementation of all civilian (= nonmilitary) defense measures of the Federal Republic of Germany and NATO, as well as the self-help of citizens against a threat in the case of tension and defense.

The goals of civil defense are:

1. Planning and implementing precautionary civilian measures for protecting and provisioning the populace in order to ensure that they survive a possible enemy attack, as well as to ensure that the support of our own armed forces and those of alliance partners is safeguarded;

2. Psychologically preparing the populace for a case of conflict as a prerequisite for an effective military alert status.

2.3 Internal security comprises:

—The protection of the constitutional, political, legal and social order of the free democratic state; i.e. state and social order; and

--The protection of the individual from dangers, criminal acts, accidents and other existence-threatening strokes of fate (see Program for Internal Security, comment on Social Welfare Code Art. 72).

3. Tasks of the police forces of the federal government and laender as a component of civil defense:

3.1 The maintenance of state and government functions comprises:

--Safeguarding a functional administration of justice by the authorities responsible for justice and criminal prosecution;

--Safeguarding the legislative process;

--Guaranteeing governmental and administrative work according to the constitution; as well as

--Maintaining of internal security by the police forces of the federal government and laender, the protection of the constitution and their support by components of the Bundeswehr (territorial army).

In order to maintain their freedom and capability of action in the event of catastrophes, crises, tension or defense, the political leadership of the Federal Republic of Germany, the state and administrative organs must at any time have the opportunity to acquire a complete as possible picture of the danger situation so that they may assess it.

It is necessary to be able to freely have sufficient means and channels of communication for the translation into action of their decisions regarding defense against external or internal dangers, for the successful forwarding and implementation of the necessary measures by subordinate authorities and to inform the populace on a timely and comprehensive basis.

The following are of particular significance in this connection:

--The behavior of the populace toward state, police and armed forces;

--Protecting communication links between government and populace, in particular radio and television (see Manila example):

--Protecting vital communication and supply systems from sabotage;

--Defense against externally directed guerrilla activity through subversive actions and so-called diversions in "hidden combat."

Present Strength of the Police Inadequate in Case of Crisis

3.2 It would be difficult for the police to meet all requirements in a crisis or defense case, because they naturally have particular importance in maintaining internal security, and this would occupy them extraordinarily. First of all they have their peacetime, conventional tasks of defense against dangers and criminal prosecution to carry on and deal with. Fighting a growing general crime rate and protection against subversion in its entire

range result from the security situation to be expected. Moreover, the police would have numerous new assignments other than those cases present in peacetime. This listing includes, inter alia:

--Police border security by units of the federal police up to the point of time of military border security after deployment of NATO units.

The federal government makes the political decision (see Border Security Directive) to release the Federal Border Guard at the frontier and deploy it at another locale in the Federal Republic of Germany for maintaining internal security (e.g. in area and installation protection).

--evacuation measures and moving to other accommodations, prevention of panic and plundering in accord. with VO re Art. 12 KatSG [abbreviations unknown];

--clearing and blocking off endangered areas;

--directing prepared population and spontaneous refugee movements (see the "Go west" study and "refugee routes" map);

--traffic police measures for the deployment of the armed forces (keeping the roads free for armed forces and protection from disaster);

--ensuring appropriate civil-defense conduct of the populace;

--assistance in damage cases;

--defending against subversive actions of "hidden combat" and protection of important installations from sabotage and plundering, as well as attempts at incitement, in cooperation with the territorial army in accord. with directive on Federal Border Guard, land police, Bundeswehr cooperation and installation protection plans;

--determining the civil defense situation;

--taking over communication tasks, teleprinting and radio messages for civil defense command sites;

--transferring penal prisoners;

--guarding interned foreigners;

--searching for escaped prisoners of war;

--turning over to the armed forces enemy soldiers who have laid down their arms;

--police enforcement assistance;

--carrying out performance requirements (BLG) [expansion unknown], rationing regulations, mobilization and induction notifications (materiel and personnel control and provisions laws, procurement laws).

It can already be seen from this list that the present strength of the police forces of the Federal Republic and laender would not be adequate by far to cope with this host of tasks.

It is thus absolutely necessary to:

- activate police reserves (this is possible in accord. with GG Art. 12a [3]);
- optimally make use of the available police capability through clear concepts, planning and prepared measures;
- prepare the police for these tasks, and
- employ them in a concentrated manner according to developments in the situation;
- relieve the police of assignments which do not urgently require the use of enforcement officers, and
- ensure close civilian-military cooperation.

4. Tasks and work levels of civilian-military cooperation as a function of total defense

This is no special field of its own; there are no legal bases geared specifically to civilian-military cooperation. Even the attempt to strive for something like this would have to prove impracticable and fail. Individual arrangements are thus all the more necessary. "It is a peg which is to combine military and civil defense into joint and uniform total defense."

Civilian-military cooperation comprises all measures (in peacetime, in case of disaster, tension and defense) agreed upon between NATO commanders and national military agencies and/or civilian authorities of the Federal Republic of Germany for arranging the relationship between their own as well as allied armed forces and the populace in areas in which armed forces move, must be supplied or are being deployed.

4.1 The tasks of civilian-military cooperation are:

- cooperation of the police, the Federal Border Guard, other civilian authorities and the Bundeswehr (BMI directive on cooperation/border security);
- information on developments in the military situation as well as the intentions and demands of NATO commanders;
- cooperation of the civilian and military NBC reporting and warning service;
- civilian and military medical and health service;
- joint protection of the rear area;
- neutralization measures;

- mutual logistical support;
- engineer support, infrastructure, damage control;
- utilization of local resources by the armed forces;
- personnel and materiel replenishments through mobilization;
- civilian and military movement control;
- coordination of the civilian (ZAP [possible expansion: civilian alert plan] and military alert plan.

4.2 The work levels of civilian-military cooperation

Federal Level

1. the Federal Security Council (BSR/1955) with subordinate
 - Departmental Directors Committee (ALA) and
 - Interministerial Secretariat;
2. Interministerial Crises Staff (1972);
3. the specialized ministries.

The Federal Security Council (BSR) is the supreme national coordinating organ of total defense.

Under the chairmanship of the federal chancellor are the following permanent members:

- the federal minister of foreign affairs,
- the federal minister of defense,
- the federal minister of the interior,
- the federal minister of finance,
- the federal minister for economics,
- the federal minister for transport.

If required, the chief of the staff of the Bundeswehr and the official in charge of disarmament and arms control take part in the sessions, which are prepared by the subordinate Departmental Directors Committee (ALA). [Article to be continued]

13084

CSO: 3620/116

CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION FOR 'TOTAL DEFENSE' SEEN LACKING

Bonn ZIVILVERTEIDIGUNG in German, No 4, 1986 pp 50-55

[Article by Helge Schulenberg: "Civil-Military Defense ZMZ [Civil-Military Cooperation] Link in Total Defense. A Critical Assessment From the Military Viewpoint and of the Military Contribution." First paragraph is ZIVILVERTEIDIGUNG introduction.]

[Text] The constitutional and legal position in the Federal Republic places military and civil defense side by side on an equal basis. Each sphere is responsible for itself. It is not permissible to transfer or take charge of the other side's functions.

Such a peculiar separation of common tasks can only function if a sufficiently strong link can combine juxtaposition with cooperation. That is the actual challenge of a snag in civil-military cooperation, founded in the constitutional and legal basis.

Numerous publications very appropriately refer to the need for finally requiring the concept of total defense, because only in this way can civil and military defense be based on a joint foundation (1). The following will not go into this in further detail, since this elementary dependency needs no further clarifications and discussion.

We should examine instead whether, in spite of a total concept at least below the federal level, structures and procedures are sufficient for the requirements of civil-military cooperation or where improvements should be possible. This is based on the well-known fundamental allocation of cooperation (Fig. 1) which has also been stabilized in peacetime administrative work.

Assessment and criticism arise from the military viewpoint and are mainly directed at the military. They are borne out in long years of experience in the general staff service in the area of conducting operations of the ground forces and territorial army. Precisely this connection has led to the realization that the separation of tasks in total defense promotes a basic attitude in the armed forces not to take the interests of civil defense into consideration at all in their own planning. But do civil defense measures not depend substantially more on armed forces planning than vice versa? How can

civil-military cooperation become a link in total defense under such circumstances?

Specialized Civil-Military Cooperation Committees

The specialized committees formed in several Bundeslaender have an importance --not to be underestimated--for intensive and functional civil-military cooperation, even if tangible results for an improvement of the overall state of affairs in total defense cannot be attained everywhere. As long as a conclusive concept for this total defense is lacking, specialized committees at the land level are limited only in the situation of solving total defense problems.

Still, the specialized committees should not be expected to exist only on paper. When even committees with important areas of responsibility have not met for years in many Bundeslaender, the question of using an alibi comes to mind.

A comparison between the specialized committees (Fig. 2 and Fig. 3) in Military Districts II (Lower Saxony and Bremen) and VI (Bavaria) shows obvious differences of ideas in the allocation of tasks. While first of all the clear assignment of limited areas of responsibility is apparent in Military District VI, the combining of sometimes very different areas of responsibility in one specialized committee in Military District II is surprising, as for instance in Specialized Committee I with the spheres of infrastructure, regional planning, blockades and neutralizations, wartime stationing.

What is also striking is that the Military District Command--as the staff of the territorial army crucial to the function as a mediator--in Bavaria is responsible for the chairmanship in four specialized committees, while WKB [expansion unknown] II holds only the chairmanship in one specialized committee for maneuvers and exercises, which, moreover, is a purely peacetime task. Among other things, questions could also be asked about the different inclusion of military agencies, if one wanted to continue the comparison between two military districts, which is not intended here. It is more a matter of making fundamental observations as to how specialized committees should be structured in order for them to be able to be a stronger link of civil-military cooperation within the framework of total defense and then be shaped uniformly--in the spirit of mutuality--in the Bundeslaender.

If we follow the view that there are indeed many areas of responsibility in which civilian and military agencies cooperate, but that civil-military cooperation in the narrower sense is a concept and function of total defense (2), then specialized committees for civil-military cooperation should not be set up for purely peacetime administrative tasks.

Moreover, civil-military cooperation cannot and should not be a one-way street. However, this danger exists if the conduct of operations of the armed forces is not at the same time also made an object of labor in the specialized committees.

Civil-military cooperation must bind civil and military defense together in the spirit of the word. The civilian and military fields which correspond to each other should therefore be combined in the specialized committees. It is much too costly to set up a specialized committee if only one side's area of responsibility is dealt with. Not every specialized job needs a committee.

The number of specialized committees should be limited in such a way that a corresponding supplement can develop on the levels of cooperation below land/military district command. Otherwise, rooted in the personnel situation, many specialized committees could be formed and in the end only the same people would sit opposite each other. But since effective civil-military cooperation should not end at the land level, an expansion to the VBK [Defense Bezirk Command]/bezirk government and possibly also VKK [Defense Kreis Command]/kreis levels would be desirable.

Under these premises, the following specialized committees would be possible and practical:

Specialized Committee I with the following tasks:

Civilian: maintaining the state, governmental and administrative function

Military: conducting operations of the armed forces

Since this specialized committee would have to work on fundamental tasks, it could also be given the function of a coordinating committee.

Specialized Committee II with the following tasks:

Civilian: providing for the populace

Military: utilization of civilian capacities by the armed forces

Among other things, the whole sphere of medical and health services, which can be contained in both areas of responsibility, would also have to be included in this specialized committee.

Specialized Committee III with the following tasks:

Civilian: population movements

Military: deployment of the armed forces

Specialized Committee IV with the following tasks:

Civilian: disaster protection

Military: damage removal

A mixture of peacetime tasks and total defense functions is of course permissible in this specialized committee.

All areas of responsibility of civil-military cooperation would be able to be covered by such an allocation. Press and public relations work perhaps assumes a special position, and a separate specialized committee which would cover peacetime tasks as well as tasks of total defense is conceivable.

The question of chairmanship on the specialized committees should not be made into a principle, all the more so as the chairman does not have any kind of authority to issue directives. Instead, they should work according to the

principle that competition stimulates business. A routine change can only contribute to stimulating the work.

The inclusion of all parties affected by civil-military defense--these are always civilian agencies, staffs of the territorial army and the command authorities of the armed forces--would of course be indispensable. Civil-military cooperation is only really effective this way. The German territorial army is given the function of mediator -- mediating in both directions, advocate for both sides and not just a mailbox.

The question that follows here is whether the territorial army can be equal to this task.

Fig. 3

Specialized Committees of Civil-Military Cooperation in Lower Saxony

FA [Specialized Committee] I - Tasks: infrastructure/regional planning/blockades and neutralizations/wartime stationing - - Chairmanship: WBV [expansion unknown] II - - Members: WBK [Military District Command II/MI [exp.unk.] Lower Saxony/Senate Chancellery HB [exp.unk.] senator for Bauw.
FA II - Tasks: supply/utilization of civilian capacities/safeguard laws - - Chairmanship: WBV II - - Members: WBK II/MW [exp.unk.] Lower Saxony/senator for ports, shipping pp [exp. unk.]

FA III - Tasks: transport and communications/civilian transportation capacities - - Chairmanship: NMW [exp.unk.] - - Members: WBK II/WBV II/senator for ports, shipping and transport and communications

FA IV - Tasks: public security and order/installation protection -- Chairmanship: NMI [exp. unk.] - - Members: WBK II/WBV II/senator for interior

FA V - Tasks: civilian and disaster defense/housing arrangement ["Aufenthaltsregelung"] - - Chairmanship: NMI - - Members: WBK II/WBV II/senator for interior

FA VI - Tasks: medical and health services - - Chairmanship: NMS [exp.unk.] - - Members: WBK II/WBV II/senator for health

FA VII - Tasks: maneuvers and exercises -- Chairmanship: WBK II - - Members: WBV II/NM/senate chancellery

FA VIII - Tasks: telecommunications - - Chairmanship: NMI - - Members: WBK II/NMI/senator for interior

FA IX - Tasks: press and public relations work -- Chairmanship: NMI - - Members: WBK II/WBV II/senate chancellery

The Territorial Army in the Mediating Function of Civil-Military Cooperation

Experts on the subject matter will be able to answer this question—even upon critical self-examination—with a clear and unequivocal NO. Nowhere do claim and reality diverge so widely from each other as in handling the mediating function in national defense.

"The function as mediator of the Territorial Command authorities ... has the goal of enabling the armed forces operating in the same area with different missions and the civil defense organs responsible there to carry out their tasks as smoothly as possible. In so doing, interests are to be balanced and planning, activities and instructions to be coordinated within the spirit of total defense."(3)

But since the spirit of total defense can only be inferred from the understanding of an existing joint concept, the lack of such makes the fulfillment of the tasks already impossible from the start. So it is no wonder then that the territorial army prefers to deal with itself rather than as a mediator expose itself to the danger of being put on the spot depending on a turn of events on the other side.

The command structure of the territorial staffs is essentially similar to the structure of the other armed forces. Civil-military cooperation has turned into an incidental task. But the legally justified separation of civil and military defense requires a link which cannot be strong enough.

The following should be done to achieve a structural improvement:

- an independent civil-military cooperation general staff department formed at the WKB in which conducting of operations, security, movement control, supply, damage removal and medical tasks are combined;
- A civil-military defense department similarly formed at the VBK [Defense Regional Command];
- at least one active officer take care of exclusively civil-military cooperation tasks at the VKK [Defense Subregion Command];
- liaison transferred partially out of reserve status to an active role in order to be constantly manned at least on the military command level with which the territorial commands and military district commands cooperate.

The quality of the personnel employed in the territorial army's civil-military defense must be improved. Educational background and training must ensure that the personnel have sufficient knowledge of both military and civil defense for the area in which they are employed. There have so far neither been courses sufficient for the requirements--thus, e.g., the seven-week "total defense" course at the Bundeswehr's leadership academy devotes all of five training hours to the role of civil defense and housing arrangement--nor does the selection of personnel meet the quality criteria.

The introduction of a compulsory course on total defense with focus on civil defense must be vigorously pursued for officers who are to be employed in civil-military cooperation or who are employed in the operational departments of higher command authorities.

Such a course must should be set up at the academy for civil defense in order to better concentrate on the civilian aspect.

Whoever rejects proposals for improvement with arguments about expense should then at least check whether perhaps quite simple resources may not also bring about a gradual improvement. If application in the territorial army--and in particular in the sphere of civil-military cooperation--were a prerequisite for attaining top military applications, the national interests in military national defense would get different importance. Perhaps a soldier in high or highest military responsibility would then sometime take up the task of helping to develop a concept of total defense.

In looking back at the essential task of the function of mediator between civil and military defense, no significant increase in positions--the requirements of which could cause the failure of too slight structural reforms in case the budget coffers are empty--is needed in the Territorial Command authorities. The personnel are at hand. They only have to be able to devote themselves to the main task.

Civil-Military Cooperation in the WINTEX-CIMEX Exercise?

The exercises of the WINTEX-CIMEX series are considered a prime example of good teamwork and well functioning civil-military cooperation. Is that really so? All the civilian agencies involved in the exercise point out successes and improvements resulting from WINTEX-CIMEX. Even the constant demonstration of continuous deficiencies and unsolved problems can be chalked up as a success for this two-year exercise series.

From a critical military viewpoint, however, the WINTEX-CIMEX exercise shows clear signs of attrition and weaknesses which should lead to an examination of the concept of this exercise.

First of all, there is the overloading of the exercise with a vast number of exercise goals. In particular, military command staffs pack nearly all unsolved problems into the exercise and believe that experiments of any form could yield experience and results for theoretical observations. They overlook the fact that only what was previously fed in can come out of a procedural exercise--unless they consciously want a certain result to emerge to push military demands through in the political sphere, which unfortunately is frequently the case. This host of exercise goals bars access to the essential matter--joint total defense.

The broad spectrum of exercise goals, from the political consultations in the NATO Alliance to the administrative work of a municipality in a crisis, hardly permits really joint exercise activity. The participation in the Bundeslaender is also much too varied. It extends from virtual abstinence to committed exercise zeal. Moreover, the persons active in the exercise change too often in the civilian and military spheres to ensure continuity. WINTEX-CIMEX is fossilized in routine and cannot give any new impetus.

The praiseworthy attempt in 1985 to practice WINTEX-CIMEX in a altered form was given up again much too quickly. So--worded oversubtly--they are staying with the old scheme of practicing civil defense in Phase I and military defense in Phase II. Mutuality is not necessary. Real civil-military cooperation, balancing interests, coordinating planning, activities and instructions, does not take place.

Civil-military cooperation should find other forms of exercise in the future. In so doing, WINTEX-CIMEX should very probably be kept as a two-year exercise, but should not fall below the level of the land and the WBK [Military District Command]. WINTEX-CIMEX would then be the total defense exercise of the Federal Republic and the Alliance, for which it would continue to have a high status of value and high-level legitimacy.

Independent total defense exercises would have to be conceived as a substitute on the level of the laender and their subdivisions. A basic scheme can be deduced from the diagram (Fig. 4). The Bundeslaender and WBK participate with a joint cadre leadership group in the whole exercise phase in the year of the WINTEX-CIMEX exercise. Such participation would be sufficient to support and nourish the exercise event and would moreover keep their own exercise load at a minimum.

For the years in between, the WBK in close cooperation with the land governments and the armed forces operating in the military district sets up CIMEX exercises in which civil-military cooperation is practiced in a concentrated manner according to the valid principles and procedures from the point of view specific to the laender.

The levels of the regional [Bezirk] governments/VBK, the land subregions [Kreise] etc./VKK and the armed forces components would then be exercise levels. These exercises would to a high degree have to stress the common nature of defense, make the mutual dependence clear and increase the awareness for cooperation.

More can be achieved in the long run with limited exercise goals on these levels than with the conglomeration in WINTEX-CIMEX.

The concept of a joint defense can also be influenced, if not entirely developed, from below by small steps and tiny ingredients. That must not be any illusion.

The armed forces, on the other hand, are subject to illusion when they base their planning and operations on areas which have in principle been cleared of the populace. This is predominantly their only idea of civil defense.

A worthwhile task for the territorial army in newly conceived exercises [would be] to translate linking and mediating functions into action and improve cooperation through conviction.

Fig. 4
Plan for CIMEX Exercise Series

Abb. 4

Plan für CIMEX-Übungsserie			
VKK KREIS	Keine (1) Übungsbeteiligung	Übungsstab (2)	← Rahmenleitung (3)
VBK BEZIRK	Keine (4) Übungsbeteiligung	Übungsstab mit Leitunganteil (5)	← XX Übungsstab (6)
WBK LAND	Gemeinsam (7) Rahmenleitung für WINTEX-CIMEX	Leitungs- und Übungsstab für CIMEX (8)	← XXX Leitungsstab (9)
Ungerades Jahr (10)		Gerades Jahr (11)	

1. No participation in exercise 2. Exercise staff 3. Cadre leadership
4. No participation in exercise 5. Exercise staff with leadership component
6. Exercise staff 7. Joint cadre leadership for WINTEX-CIMEX 8. Leadership
and exercise staff for CIMEX 9. Leadership staff 10. Odd year 11. Even year

Civil-Military Cooperation -- Convince Instead of Persuade

The success of any cooperation is shaped by the degree of the willingness to cooperate on the part of those involved. The possibilities for the mediator to balance things out are always only limited. However, his power of conviction determines the extent of the willingness to compromise. The civil-military cooperation discussions and meetings with pathetic results are countless. Successes cannot be brought about by simply talk. The meaningfulness of the arguments and information must convince, and the mediator must have the power to convince. As long as high allied command authorities with (attested) observations do not permit themselves the activity of mediator, the territorial army can neither persuade nor convince, but join in the talk at most.

It would be good if the exchange of information required for crisis and war were employed and constantly practiced already in peacetime.

"In crisis and war a constant flow of information between both the allied armed forces and the Territorial Command authorities on the one hand and between the civil defense authorities as well the federal defense

administration and the Territorial Command authorities is imperative. The Territorial Command authorities have to ensure that in civil-military cooperation the reciprocal information on the effects of one side's intention is guaranteed to the interests of the other. Included here especially is information on

- the military situation
- the regional security situation
- the civil defense situation
- particular features of the area. (4)"

Why should this information not be exchanged in continual, certainly joint functions even in peacetime? The armed forces will be convinced sometime that they do not operate alone in our country and that cooperation also demands consideration. The constitutional and legal base--to come back to the starting point--is not affected and not altered. But it would be beneficial to civil defense and the civilian population; it would be a starting point toward total defense.

Bibliography

1. Regarding this, cf., inter alia, Juerg von Kalckreuth "Civil Defense Within the Framework of Total Defense." The Federal Republic of Germany's Tasks and Need to Catch Up. Nomos Publishing Company 1985. International Policy and Security, Vol. 18
2. Regarding this, cf.: Helmut Duell in "Civil-Military Cooperation" in the magazine "Civil Defense 1/82"
3. Federal Ministry of Defense Regulation "The Army in Military National Defense" AnwFE [Instruction for Command and Operations] 100/500 No. 107
4. Federal Ministry of Defense Regulation a.a.d. No. 413

13084

CSO: 3620/117

ADMIRAL ASSERTS NATO DISSATISFIED WITH NORWEGIAN FLEET

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 6 Feb 87 p 84

[Article by Liv Hegna: "NATO Not Satisfied: Norway Must Replace the Fleet"]

[Text] "NATO is dissatisfied with the fact that Norway is not replacing its naval and escort vessels. On the other hand, the replacement program for the submarine fleet is in accordance with the alliance's wishes, Vice-Admiral Roy Breivik said at the Atlantic Committee's security policy seminar on Thursday.

Breivik, who is the Atlantic Command's representative at NATO headquarters in Brussels, said that American aircraft carrier groups in the Norwegian Sea are a political signal that the alliance means business if an attack should come from the Soviet Union. In addition, he emphasized the flexibility of the deployment of American and British naval forces in the Norwegian Sea.

The ability to wage war in Europe well into 10 days is totally dependent on supply reinforcements from across the Atlantic. The battle concerning the Norwegian Sea is an important element of NATO's advanced defense strategy for the protection of communications lines across the Atlantic. Eight hundred shiploads of military equipment will be needed in the first 30 days, and 1500 shiploads for civilian purposes during the same period, Breivik said. In addition, he said that the Soviet Union has increased by one third its fleet of destroyers and frigates, while West Europe has scaled down its corresponding fleet by over 30 percent. In connection with the construction of new aircraft carriers in the Soviet Union, Breivik said that this will increase the Russians' air superiority considerably. And he added: If the Soviet Union occupies the air bases in North Norway and Iceland the battle for the Norwegian Sea will be over.

8831

CSO: 3639/21

NATO'S NORTHERN EUROPE COMMANDER: FORCES OBSOLETE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 3 Feb 87 p 4

[Article by Liv Hegna: "Howlett: Norwegian Armed Forces Obsolete"]

[Text] "Will the Norwegian defense system function if there is a war? Is Norway using so many resources on equipment for the individual soldier that more advanced materiel cannot be afforded? And although Norway has one of the largest mobilization armies in NATO in proportion to its population, are they sufficiently trained and modernized? Or are the last war's requirements actually being prepared for?"

The supreme commander of the North Command, General Sir Geoffrey Howlett, thus challenged our military strategy during his speech at the Atlantic Conference in Asker yesterday. For more effective training, he suggested weekend exercises for mobilization units, as in the British national defense system.

The commander of the North Command said that NATO has its big weakness on the conventional side. He said that he sees a growing unwillingness to increase defense appropriations because people in the West have faith in a breakthrough in the arms reduction talks soon. Besides, he believed, people want most to use limited social resources on other things than defense, and then he pointed out that many are hoping for a military technology breakthrough which will make it unnecessary to use so much money on the military.

General Howlett said that as far as kroner and ører [dollars and cents] are concerned, NATO and the Warsaw Pact are using just as much on defense. The point, he thought, is that NATO is far less coordinated in its effort.

Brigade Visit

The question of allied reinforcements for Norway and Denmark in a crisis situation is bound up with economic problems, General Howlett said as a comment on recent speculations concerning the Canadian and British brigades' exercises in Norway. It would be far more reasonable to exercise them in West Germany, where they already have a supply apparatus.

NATO must find a way to finance a reinforcement apparatus if they are still to be earmarked for an effort on the north flank. And the general added: "It

will be less tempting to send these forces to areas where the local forces are not doing everything in their power to help themselves."

Unclear Border Policy

"The Soviet Union wants no clear borders in the north. The moment they are fixed, one is legally bound, too. With the growing strategic importance the Svalbard area has for military developments, diffuse borders are something which is to the advantage of the Soviet Union. Norway has also not changed its defense policy in the northern regions, but with oil developments as a new element, now is the time for a new assessment."

It was Researcher Finn Sollie who expressed these ideas in his speech at the Atlantic Committee's security policy conference at Leangkollen yesterday. He thought that global naval strategy developments and nuclear weapons developments have put the northern regions at the focus of the security policy debate.

Ex-Defense-Minister, Atlantic Committee Chairman Rolf Hansen said in his speech that we "are undergoing a security policy transformation which will be intensified considerably in the time to come." Hansen thought that customary attitudes and political stands will be challenged. He thought that the difficulties we face can tempt some to bet on "new security policy horses," but he cautioned against going other ways than a common NATO way. It is the North Atlantic alliance which will be the practicable way in the future, Rolf Hansen said.

The North a Buffer

Researcher Finn Sollie said that the Soviet Union can regard the North as a buffer against an attack from the west, but that Scandinavia can just as well be considered a springboard for an attack to the west.

Finn Sollie said that the three most important operations areas for the modern Soviet strategic submarines are the waters between Greenland and Iceland, south of Svalbard and in the Barents Sea. Sollie mentioned this as an example of a development which has gone on without a change in Norwegian defense policy.

Unclear Borders

Finn Sollie pointed out that the Russians are trying to avoid Norwegian monitoring of their activities on Svalbard. Sollie said: "If I were a Soviet admiral, I would go to great lengths as far as accepting a dividing line far to the east is concerned, but most of all I would want for no conclusion at all to be reached. As soon as there is a border, the jurisdiction is fixed, you see." Finn Sollie thought that with developments in the oil and gas sector it can be desirable to have "fluid" borders in the north. Finn Sollie concluded by saying that the Svalbard area represents an area where military strategy, geological and economic interests cross, not just nationally, but also internationally.

8831

CSO: 3639/21

GENERAL SUPPORTS AIRCRAFT CARRIERS IN NORWEGIAN SEA

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 31 Jan 87 p 8

[Article by Liv Hegna: "NATO Important in Norwegian Sea"]

[Text] "The most important contribution to Norwegian security and the defense of North Norway is without doubt the presence of the Atlantic Command's aircraft carrier group, the so-called Streaking Fleet Atlantic, in the Norwegian Sea."

This was said to AFTENPOSTEN by the supreme commander in North Norway, Lieutenant General Vigleik Eide. He added that he is strongly for increasing the allied presence during exercises in the winter, too.

"The main threat to North Norway is the Kola Peninsula with its enormous forces and installations. The lion's share of the Soviet forces which are meant to defeat NATO's strategic naval force and two thirds of the Soviet Union's ballistic submarines are based here. These forces have the capacity to establish a strong defensive buffer zone with the purpose of controlling the Norwegian Sea, which is totally decisive if they want to be sure of access to the North Atlantic," Lieutenant General Eide says.

[Question] Do you consider Sweden's and Finland's defense capacity strong enough to withstand an attack through these countries' territory?

[Answer] "Sweden is still considered able to withstand an attack if its forces have mobilized. Sweden also recognizes the importance of having a strong defense in its northern territory. The biggest problem for Sweden will probably be preventing the use of Swedish airspace in the event of war. Finland is also of importance as a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and North Norway, and we expect that the Finns will resist violation of Finnish territory. However, the forces in the north are relatively few in number. In spite of capable leaders and good morale, we have to consider North Finland, including the Finnish Wedge, as a possible transit area for military forces."

[Question] As far as the forces which the Soviet Union can bring into action against our territory are concerned, are we using a /realistic/ [in italics] yardstick?

[Answer] "The Soviet Union's military strength is formidable and is growing steadily. An attack which secures Soviet control over the areas north of Vestfjorden [West Fjord] will also give the Soviet Union a strategic advantage. But an attack of this sort will require such large forces that the standing army forces on the Kola Peninsula will have to be supplied with considerable reinforcements."

"Besides, it will require support by large air forces. This will give us warning time and the ability to bring reinforcements into action in North Norway," Eide says, and he adds that the Soviet soldier must not be measured "10 feet too tall."

8831

CSO: 3639/21

ECONOMIC BENEFIT SEEN IN JOINT SUBMARINE BUILDING PACT

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 1 Feb 87 p 14

[Article: "Industry Success in Submarines"]

[Text] Bergen (NTB [Norwegian Wire Service]): The joint submarine venture between Norway and West Germany can come to provide Norwegian industry with over four billion kroner in revenues.

Almost 200 Norwegian firms have supplied almost three billion kroner worth of products to the industrial giant Thyssen since 1982. The ex-top-head of the West German concern, Doctor of Engineering Helmut Hucks, reports to BERGENS TIDENDE that this amount will probably be increased by 300 million German marks, or around 1.1 billion kroner, up to 1992. When the Naval Supply Command signed the submarine agreement with the Thyssen concern in 1982, the condition was that Norwegian industry would get assignments for at least 60 percent of the contract sum. The agreement is in force for 10 years, but the 60-percent requirement has been fulfilled already after four years. Navy Inspector General, Rear Admiral Bjarne Grinstvedt characterizes the submarine agreement with West Germany as the best the navy has ever entered into.

8831

CSO: 3639/21

FORTRESS SYSTEM ADAPTED TO NEW COMBAT CONDITIONS, WEAPONS

Frauenfeld SCHWEIZER SOLDAT + MFD in German Feb 87 pp 6-8

[Article by Maj Gen Rolf Siegenthaler, Inspector General of Engineers and Fortress Troops: "Fortresses of the Future"]

[Text] Definition

Switzerland, in contrast to France and its Maginot Line, for example, has never had an integrated fortification system. Rather, we have restricted ourselves, and still do, to the fortification of operationally important zones and "unavoidable passages." Because of this, our "fortresses" consist of great numbers of varied, but mutually supplementary types of construction which are built into firm terrain. Concomitantly with evolving types of threat, the types of construction of fortified installations have of necessity undergone changes. Rather than speaking of fortifications in the traditional sense, we might speak of fortified areas.

The Basic Type of Infantry Combat in Fortified Areas

The Commission for Military National Defense (KML) approved in 1983 a model for conducting infantry operations which is adapted to the latest type of threat. It has the following main characteristics, which must be met in particularly sensitive areas (Figures 1 and 2):


Figure 1. Pattern for a Barricade Position



Key:

1. Terrain tank obstacle or tank barricade or object for blowing up
2. Weapon emplacement or infantry bunker
3. Field shelter or nuclear weapon protective shelter

Figure 2. Installations in Barricade Positions



Key:

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Nuclear weapon protective shelter | 4. Object for blowing up |
| 2. Field shelter | 5. Terrain tank obstacle |
| 3. Weapon emplacement | 6. Tank barricade |
| | 7. Infantry bunker |

--The enemy is stopped at the main obstacle (in the most difficult terrain sector). Main obstacles can consist of permanent objects to be blown up, terrain tank obstacles, tank barricades or combinations thereof;

--To deprive the enemy of the ability to easily clear, overcome or destroy the obstacles, they must be cleverly built into the reverse slope terrain. Additionally, they must be reinforced by mines and be within the field of fire of friendly antitank defenses and supporting weapons;

--Weapon emplacements must be constructed in a manner which protects them from direct hits;

--To enable the forward defense to survive the massed enemy attack preparation fire, it must have direct hit-proof shelters;

--Communication facilities which are protected from near misses must be used by observers in protected observation posts to alert forward defense troops. The same is true for fire control of the support weapons by the artillery fire control officers.

Inside the heavily fortified areas of the border, redoubt and fortress brigades all command posts and control facilities are sheltered also; they have at their disposal separate wire networks which are independent of others.

The purpose of this system is to force the enemy into being subjected to our combat methods. Rather than being able to fight a mechanized battle from a moving start, the adversary is forced to use infantry-type attacks against us. His superiority in mechanized mobility and firepower can no longer be used to best advantage. He must attack us on foot and thereby forego his greatest advantages. We are now his equal.

Maximum emphasis in the superpowers' resources lies in two areas:

1. Full mechanization and attack by their joint services from a moving start;

--armored units,

--motorized infantry units,

--helicopter gunships and aircraft in ground operations,

--vertical envelopments with helicopter transport and airborne units;

--heavy artillery preparation of enemy bases, reserves, artillery and logistics and continuous support of attack operations.

2. Use of all available resources to destroy enemy mobility, i.e., attacking mobile enemy soft and semi-soft targets.

Antitank Defense

With the procurement of the Leopard 87 battle tank, the old Centurion tanks will be retired after 1989. The 10.5 cm gun and the turret of the Centurion still constitutes a valuable weapon system. Built into infantry bunkers and equipped with additional armor, they remain a very effective weapon which can be neutralized by the enemy only with great difficulty. Their use is proposed in barricade positions with corridors wide enough to accommodate tanks, where the range of the 9-cm antitank guns is insufficient.

Modern Artillery Support from Fortifications

The majority of our fortifications was built shortly before and during World War II (1938-1945). Since then a number of modernizations and new construction have taken place.

Today we are faced with the following major problems:

- The relationship between firepower and installation size is no longer valid for World War II Art fortresses (Figure 3) [not included];
- Maintenance costs are continuously increasing. Spare parts are no longer available for old machinery and facilities. Circuits are rusting, electric cables decay, facilities are partly obsolete;
- The fortresses are very large and spread out. They require a great deal of manpower for work crews and forward defense;
- The degree of security afforded is quite variable and unbalanced to meet a variety of threats. Bolstering the degree of security in certain areas is extremely expensive.
- In view of the size and circumference of such installations, the use of nuclear weapons for their destruction appears worthwhile;
- Most of these installations offer a large frontal target area to enemy fire for great distances;
- Tank turrets are very vulnerable to enemy aircraft and helicopter gunships.

For the above reasons, the modernization of our fortifications is an urgent matter. This modernization is a long drawn-out process and must be conducted step by step. That is why the next generation of fortress troop members must partially continue to serve in obsolescent facilities.

Figures 4 through 12 [not included] show the weaponry and infrastructure of today's fortifications.

A New Concept of Fortresses

Studies are presently underway for a new concept and preliminary designs for modern types of artillery and infantry installations. The following criteria are being observed:

- Fortress artillery must not generate greater expenditures than armored artillery as to procurement and maintenance;
- Manpower requirements must be greatly reduced;
- The facilities must be designed for easy maintenance;

--Reduction of comfort, i.e., no underground barracks. The major consideration is armament and combat equipment;

--Weapons effectiveness must be increased through the use of high-performance instruments for target reconnaissance, fire control, trajectory control and determination of fire elements, as well as through modernization of communications facilities;

--The facilities must have adequate, balanced protection against all types of threat;

--Resupply independence must be appropriate to the mission and must be equally effective for all areas concerned;

--The fortress artillery must have longer range and more effective guns and ammunition;

--Our defense must be capable of destroying any and all known enemy combat vehicles by direct as well as indirect fire;

--The threat from the air by helicopter gunships, ground-support aircraft and "smart" munitions must be taken into account.

Fortress Artillery

The Armament Services Group (GRD) has been working since 1984 on the development of a new 15.5-cm fortress gun. It will be based on the M 109 tank howitzer, so as to establish compatibility with the mobile artillery, as well as identical logistics and training with respect to gun and ammunition.

With the increased range of the new guns, our fortress artillery enters a new dimension. We can conduct the battle in the depth of the battle area. The implications for fire control and fire guidance will be dealt with later on.

It is important for us to make use of the super-powers' insights in restricting enemy movement.

We can use indirect fire to hamper enemy movement and to destroy hard and semi-hard targets with the aid of smart missiles (Stryx for fortress mine launchers, among others) and with the aid of container rounds with armor-piercing submunition or mines.

This will serve to bring early relief to our direct-firing antitank defense, thus saving it from overcommitment.

Technical Resources

--Reconnaissance:

With the increased range of fortress guns, it will be possible in the future to move the firefight into the depth of the enemy's assembly area. This will be possible, however, if adequate means of reconnaissance (drones) are available.

Another important task is attacking enemy fire positions, i.e., anti-battery fire. Artillery radar will be needed to detect the weapon emplacements.

--Fire control:

To simplify registration fire and to be able to achieve surprise in fire assaults, the introduction of a trajectory-measuring system would be extremely useful.

The long range of the new guns will also generate problems with overlapping target sectors in using fortress artillery. This will require a greater number of fire control squads, new and much more efficient communications and better equipment for the fire controllers.

The integration of artillery communications networks, enlargement of the capacity of these networks, automation of connections and data transmission are of great significance for the speed of fire initiation. These wire networks must be backed up with high-performance radio networks.

Nothing is more mobile than artillery fire. This mobility must be enhanced at all costs, because this is the only way to obtain optimum performance.

In comparison with the guns, the ammunition is becoming increasingly expensive; in barrel artillery it consumes one-third of the cost today. With new munitions, it amounts to about one-half or even more. For multiple missile launchers, 80 percent. Therefore, everything must be done to:

- improve target accuracy;
- have all-weather capability;
- improve ammunition effect on the target;
- enhance the degree of effectiveness of the munitions;
- lengthen the range.

Among the means to achieve these goals are:

- drones for real-time reconnaissance data;
- artillery radar for reconnaissance of enemy fire sources;
- trajectory measurement for surprise and target accuracy;
- data processing and data transmission for speedy fire initiation.

Prospects

At the present time there are ongoing studies for developments until about the year 2010. These studies will have a variety of impacts upon the future of the fortress troops, some of which are already recognizable.

The following objectives must certainly be reached:

- Increased firepower and range of fortress artillery;
- reduction in manpower requirements and cost;
- decentralization of the combat force into many small facilities which in themselves make relatively unattractive targets, rather than a few large ones;
- standardization of the mobile and fortress artilleries as to equipment, training, command and logistics.

The first steps in this direction have been taken; others will follow. It is certain that in the future, too, the fortress troops will have an important mission within the framework of our national defense. Should it be possible to translate today's projects into reality, the significance of the fortress troops could even increase, because their quickly established readiness after war mobilization requires it. Two generations of fortress artillerymen from now can count on technical developments which promise to be most interesting for the fortress system.

Deployment of guided artillery missiles out of bunkers has been operational for a long time with the super-powers, however with nuclear warheads in the megaton range, which will always be out of the question for us. However, the cost-effectiveness ratio will in the normal course of events change in such a way that future use of guided artillery missiles of medium range (about 150 km) with conventional warheads could become easily affordable for our country also. Could it be then that circumstances would make our large-scale facilities below the granite of the St Gotthard and Grimsel Passes useful once again? Actually, weapons of that sort are used even today in the Gulf War, and things that Iran and Iraq can afford should eventually be within reach for ourselves also.

Conclusions

Quick Defense Readiness:

Fortress facilities are defense-ready within 24 hours. There is no quicker means for quick readiness.

Combat Capability:

Initially, the artillery, using modern munitions, can accomplish all defensive tasks, insofar as fire control and target reconnaissance are guaranteed. This is true even for a strategic assault.

In addition, some fortress units, stationed in Monoblocks with 15.5-cm guns in the center of the country, could serve as the long-sought corps artillery.

Manpower Reductions:

The optimum objective of the concept in this respect is as follows:
Instead of 30-120 men per gun, only 15-30 men per gun.

Deterrent Effect:

Weapons in fortified emplacements have always had a deterrent effect. Greater emphasis must be placed on using this effect. Our installations must provide good protection against all types of threat. This provides trust and security in our preparations. This factor cannot be stressed too much. The high esprit of the fortress troops must be maintained and further improved. For this reason we must keep the "fortress troops" concept, even if "fortresses" in the traditional sense will no longer exist.

Protection Against Neutron Weapons:

Against modern neutron weapons a shielding factor of at least 10,000 will be required. Boron-enriched concrete of 1 meter thickness has this shielding factor; it reduces neutron radiation measuring 10,000 rad (radiation energy per measuring unit, 1 rad = 100 erg/g) to such an extent that the troops inside the bunker survive without appreciable injury or radiation sickness.

Combined Weapons:

We must consider the fortress artillery as a part of the overall system, achieving optimum effect in conjunction with the other weapons. It is not a case of "either/or;" rather, it is "not only/but also."

9273/9604

CSO: 3620/160

END

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

20 July 1987